Thursday, December 11, 2008

Panamanian Election could mean another victory for Chavez.

Panamanian Election could mean another victory for Chavez.
By Nicholas Hanlon*
It is no secret that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is mobilizing politically and militarily to create an anti-U.S. climate in Latin America. Chavez has now turned his attention to the upcoming elections in Panama; a small but strategically placed country connecting Central and South America. Panama is vital to U. S. economic and military interests. As stated in the August 14th edition of the Americas Report, “the United States is the largest user of the Panama Canal and 15-20% of U.S. trade including 40% of grain exports and 670,000 barrels of oil a day come through the canal.”[i] At present, the favored winner of the Panamanian presidential elections in May, 2009 is Balbina Herrera of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). What we know of Herrera bodes poorly for the U.S. Her behavior, which bears a striking resemblance to that of Chavez, combined with past ties to Noriega, casts a potentially dark shadow on the future of the United States- Panamanian relationship.
Herrera represents the left wing of the PRD. She is clearly comfortable with dictatorial rule, remaining loyal to her party through two modern dictators; Omar Torrijos and Manuel Noriega. Herrera used to refer to herself as a “Torrejista de Verdad” or true Torrejista. Yet, she perhaps owes more of her political success to Manuel Noriega.[i] Noriega, himself, claims to have hidden in her house during the 1989 U.S. invasion. As a professional politician educated in Cuba, she has served as head of the National Assembly and as Housing Administrator in the current government of Martin Torrijos, the moderate son of the late dictator Omar Torrijos. As mayor of San Miguelito, during the Noriega years, she became known for threatening to kill protesters on sight using the catch phrase, “protesters seen, and protesters dead.”[ii]

The name “Manuel Noriega” conjures dark memories for most Panamanians. One of his political opponents was savagely tortured and beheaded. Noriega’s rule was characterized by violence, corruption, and poverty for those not in the military elite. Most Panamanians would rather forget him. Some might like to see him returned to stand trial for crimes against humanity. He has been tried and convicted in Panama for murder, embezzlement, and corruption in absentia. Political science professor, Miguel Antonio Bernal, believes that there are small pockets among Panama’s political elite who remain sympathetic, if not loyal, and who hope to learn something of Noriega’s fabled hidden fortunes. According to him, "If Noriega returns to Panama, it's certain the great number of 'Noriegists' that are in the government disguised as ministers, lawmakers, judges, and prosecutors will want to do everything possible to ensure that Noriega doesn't go to jail,".[iii] Whether Noriega returns to Panama or not, former friend, Balbina Herrera, has secured her parties nomination despite allegations that she has received money from Hugo Chavez for her campaign.

Like Hugo Chavez, Herrera won her parties’ primary by drawing an overwhelming number of votes from poor communities. She told Reuters that, "We are reaching levels of growth of 10 percent, but we need to generate wealth, as well as employment, so we can redistribute it."[iv] Chavez was able to consolidate and build power with the same promises long before he began to deliver results in the form of his now questionable poverty programs. Thus far, Herrera has distanced herself from Chavez and most likely will continue do so. Herrera wants to appear as a moderate towards the U.S. given the benefit of Panamanian/U.S. economic relations. Since she needs the support of Panama’s business class, she has vowed to choose a young businessman for her running mate. As a career politician, Herrera has never participated in the business community and must now create a semblance of economic credibility.

During the primary it was easy for Herrera’s camp to dismiss insinuations of a Chavez connection. It was obvious that her competition would try to tie her to Venezuela’s leader. Now, evidence of a money trail is emerging. Opponents of Chavez in Venezuela are reporting that Chavez is selling oil to Panamanian businessmen well below market price, who in turn, sell it in Panama for huge profits. These profits, in turn, have found their way to finance the Herrera campaign. The source of these reports, Mega TV, promises that more details are to come.[v] Those who write off concerns of Balbina Herrera’s Chavez like behavior should be reminded that the state of Panama’s democratic institutions are most likely not strong enough to withstand a leader determined to follow the Chavez model. USAID describes Panamanian democracy as follows;

“Panama's constitution grants strong executive powers to the central government, and gives considerable immunity to legislators, judges, and high-ranking executive branch officials. There are no clear or accessible points of entry for citizens or civil society organizations to influence decision making. Concepts of conflict of interest and transparency are virtually absent from political discourse and practices. Corruption is prevalent and public opinion surveys place corruption as a primary concern, second only to unemployment. In the meantime, press gag laws remain in effect while leadership of the judiciary reform movement falls to a nascent civil society.”[vi]

Though a multi-party system, executive power has only been shared among two parties since 1990. Power is brokered by political elites of which Herrera has been a part for the duration of Panama’s struggle for democracy. In a best case scenario, electoral realities might keep Herrera moderate and pragmatic for a time. Due to the popularity of her opponent for the presidency, Ricardo Martinelli, Herrera may be forced to forge some kind of alliance with him in order to win the election. Yet, Herrera has two major advantages. The PRD party membership makes up almost exactly 20% of the 3.3 million population. Further, the PRD holds 47 of 78 seats in the unicameral National Assembly. Martinelli, of the Democratic Change party, rivals her in the polls but comes from a very small party with only 3 seats in the National Assembly. His differences with important potential allies in the Panamenista Party make an alliance unlikely. With 47 of 78 seats in the National Parliament, election cycle alliances will not hold much sway over a Herrera administration.

There are three issues of concern that tie Panama to U. S. national security. The first and most vital is the Panama Canal which is now under the control of the Chinese shipping company, Hutchinson Whampoa. With their close ties to the Chinese military, Hutchinson Whampoa has fifty year leases which give them control over both ends of the Canal. A strategic Chinese advantage at a global choke point is ominous and in times of conflict could put the U.S. at a serious military disadvantage. For example:

“Admiral Moore, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claims that in case of military conflict in the Pacific, a large number of logistic ships need uninterrupted access to the canal to support deployed forces. If the use of the canal were denied, those ships would need to travel an extra 9,000 miles around South America and would not be able to sustain combat effectiveness in the Pacific. “It is not ‘managing traffic’ under normal circumstances with which I am concerned,” said Moore, “it is the ability of a potential enemy to disrupt traffic so as to block military supply, which in times of conflict is 80 to 90 percent dependent upon sea lift capability for there to be any sustained forward effort.”[vii]

The strategic importance of the Panama Canal is a clear indication of the seriousness of Panama’s coming May 3rd 2009 election. In the almost ten years that Hugo Chavez has been in power he has actively forged strong economic and military alliances with China, Russia and Iran. Even without the flamboyant anti-American rhetoric of Chavez, a Chavista-like leader in Panama could further strengthen the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in a region vital to our economic and military interests.

Secondly, Panama has become fertile ground for drug trafficking, money laundering and gang activity both on land and at sea and could potentially provide a haven for terrorist groups. If this doesn’t seem urgent, reconsider the implications of Chavez’s fast growing military and economic relationship with Iran. With Iranian ties comes the same terrorist trade craft and networks that Iran uses in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq to provide terrorists with training and equipment to wage war on Israel and on American soldiers. Now consider these executives of terror working together in a synergistic relationship with the FARC and a host of other associates that Chavez is financing throughout the hemisphere.

Finally, the Panamanian/U.S. economic relationship is significant and should be nurtured. According to current information:

“Between 2003 and 2007, U.S. exports of merchandise to Panama grew 102 percent from $1.8 billion in 2003 to $3.7 billion in 2007, outperforming overall U.S. merchandise export growth, which was 60 percent for the same period. The market access and trade disciplines provided by the Agreement offer an opportunity to further expand U.S. exports to a region that is already seeing high export growth rates. In 2007, U.S. - Panama total trade amounted to $4.1 billion with the United States registering a sizable trade surplus of $3.4 billion. U.S. exports in 2007 were $3.7 billion, up 38 percent from the previous year.”[viii]

U.S. business leaders with strong ties to Panama should be apprehensive about dealing with someone whose political rhetoric obligates her to fulfill anti-capitalist campaign promises. Furthermore, US/Panamanian relations have been strained by the delayed ratification of the bilateral Trade Promotion Agreement that President Bush negotiated with Panama which was signed last year. The agreement stands to greatly improve relations by encouraging greater transparency, accountability, property rights, and customs enforcement. While the possibility of ratification has been put off until the next U.S. administration, Panama, in the meantime, will likely strengthen ties with Canada, Mexico, and Guatemala.

Thus far, Herrera has been politically expedient in her quest to gain power. In order to ally fears, she has distanced herself from Chavez and Noriega. She is reassuring the business class with her promises of a business-friendly vice-presidential nominee while at the same time promising wealth redistribution to the poor. With all necessary parties satisfied, the way to the Presidency is opening. Yet, on what basis should we try to predict how Herrera will behave in office? Any politician is better judged by past behavior and ideological tendencies than campaign season rhetoric. The former betrays what a candidate truly wants. An ideological twin of Chavez and the political child of an aggressor like Noriega will not be friendly to free market principles or to the United States. Balbina Herrera will join Venezuela’s strategic alliance with China, Russia, and Iran against the United States while continuing to give lip service to the pro-business, U.S. friendly electorate in Panama.

*Nicholas Hanlon is an intern at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of Georgia State University and has a BA in Political Science with a concentration in International Affairs and a Minor in French.

[i] Panama-Guide.com, Balbina Herrera Wins PRD Primary - Now What? Don Winner, 09/08/08
[ii] Zimbio/www.panama-guide.com, Balbina Herrera Refuses To Pledge to Countermand Executive Decrees, Don Winner, 09/26/08
[iii] CNN.com/world, Panama braces for Noriega release Associated Press, 08/14/2007
[iv] www.boston.com, Early Panama election favorite has anti-U.S. past Andrew Beatty, 0527/2008
[v] tvn-2.com, Supuestos nexos de Balbina y Chávez nuevamente salen a relucir Jesus Morales, 10/17/2008

[vi] USAID Budget Panama 06/16/20005
[vii] The Americas Report China’s Control of the Panama Canal Revisited Yojiro Konno with Nancy Menges Vol. Nº 4 – Issue 33–August 14, 2008
[viii] www.export.gov expanded economic opportunities U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement

[i] The Americas Report China’s Control of the Panama Canal Revisited Yojiro Konno with Nancy Menges Vol. Nº 4 – Issue 33–August 14, 2008

Tuesday, November 18, 2008

The Upcoming Elections in Venezuela.

The Upcoming Elections in Venezuela.
By Nicole M. Ferrand.*

On November 23, 2008 regional elections will be held in Venezuela. Citizens will head to the polls to elect 22 governors, 328 mayors as well as 233 legislators to the state legislative councils and 13 councilors to district committees — including indigenous representation — totaling 603 positions. These will be the first elections to be held since President Hugo Chavez founded the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, PSUV in Spanish).

For a majority of Venezuelans these elections are an opportunity to put a stop to Chavez’s plans to stay in power and impose a socialist model in the country and they are encouraged by the polls which give the opposition the upper hand in many localities.

Although Chávez is not running, he is vociferously campaigning for the PSUV’s candidates. His public appearances have been marked by a violent and threatening rhetoric which has convinced voters that he is afraid of losing important positions to the opposition.
“Mobsters, mafia, thugs, shameless, crooks, traitors, imperial pawns, bandits, thugs, cowards, drug dealers or terrorists" are some of the epithets that Chávez has used to label opposition candidates throughout the electoral campaign. He has gone as far as publicly saying that if the opposition wins the upcoming elections, he will launch a “military plan” or “Plan Chávez” to be deployed in the states and municipalities in which his party has been defeated. “No one should forget that this is a peaceful revolution, yet it is one that bears arms.” “I beg you not to betray our people” and warned that only two options exist: “A socialist nation or death.”[1] For Chávez, the upcoming election is pivotal to secure his hold on power.

Why the Violent Speeches?
Many believe that the increasingly negative polls that give independents favorable results are troubling Hugo Chavez and are convinced that he is using the same strategy that has worked for him in the past: in order to win he needs to polarize voters. All along his ultimate goal has been to change the Constitution so that he can stay in power for life and to achieve this, the PSUV needs to score enough votes in November.

He has directly attacked candidates such as Pablo Pérez: “Now they want to put an imbecile in the governor’s office to do whatever he (current Zulia state Governor Manuel Rosales) says,” and “I am speaking nothing but the truth; now he (Rosales) wants to have an imbecile as governor, an imbecile who cannot even speak properly.” In reference to the opposition candidate to the Mayor’s Office of the Sucre Municipality Carlos Ocariz, Chávez said: “Someone named Ocariz, who wants to be mayor of Petare, a rich boy. We are going to swat away those rich kids, born with a silver spoon in their mouths.”

The states at stake are Zulia, Miranda, Carabobo, Lara, Táchira, Anzoátegui, Bolivar and Aragua. Of these, all but Zulia are today in the hands of Chavismo and according to the polls, it is likely that more than half will fall into the oppositions’ hands. Of the 24 regional districts at stake, the Chavismo holds 22 and the opposition holds only Margarita and the wealthy state of Zulia.

According to the Electoral Commission which Chavez controls, he was reelected as President of Venezuela in 2006 with 63% of the vote. He has appealed to the poor through his populist measures funded by constantly increasing oil prices. At the time, he was on top of the world but since then he has lost many battles. In December, 2007, his wish to change the constitution and to stay in power was defeated in the referendum and according to the results, he will have to leave the Presidency in 2013. In addition the special powers he pursued to secure a socialist model were rejected by the voters.

He knows his popularity has suffered major setbacks in recent months and that this will be seen in the results of November 23rd. Among his least popular moves was the closing down of the RCTV television station, whose soap operas were a favorite among many nationals including Chavista voters. In addition, public services and utilities are collapsing and in recent months Venezuela has had three national blackouts which lasted several hours each. The health system has been increasingly criticized and major cities are literally under garbage. The fall in the price of oil and inflation reaching 40% as well as high crime rates are only making matters worse.

Internationally, he also suffered a loss of support. When the laptops of FARC leader, Raul Reyes, were seized in Ecuador, evidence surfaced that Chavez was a long time FARC supporter and had even financed their internal war, giving them sanctuary inside Venezuela, supplying them with weapons and actively working with them to undermine the government of Colombia. This information didn’t sit well with Venezuelans or with many in the international community.

All of the above plus his enormous expenditures on advanced weaponry have made people uneasy about having him as President and fear his totalitarian style and increased radicalization to the left. They know Venezuela and Chavez are considered pariahs by many democracies in the world and emphatically disagree with their president’s choice of new allies such as Iran and Russia since they have nothing in common. They want to follow a new path towards progress and Chavez is clearly taking them in the opposite direction.

Banning Candidates
On August 5, 2008, in an unprecedented move, the Supreme Court ruled that the 270 candidates that had been banned from running in November’s state and municipal elections were constitutional. The list of barred candidates was issued by Venezuela’s anti-corruption chief and Chavez’s ally, Clodosbaldo Russian. He said the law gave him the right to impose restrictions on potential candidates “suspected of corruption.” The opposition was and is still adamantly saying that the ban was unconstitutional because none of the potential candidates have been convicted of a crime, stating that the disqualification was politically motivated since it affected key opponents of the PSUV. Even the European Parliament condemned the government’s move as a violation of human rights.

In spite of this, the opposition has managed to unite and run single candidates in most districts and is likely to win in Zulia, Carabobo, and Miranda. If we add the Caracas metropolitan district, the opposition could obtain almost 40% of the vote.

Manuel Rosales
The focus of Chavez’s rage is the former presidential challenger, current Zulia State governor and now an opposition candidate for Mayor of Venezuela’s western city of Maracaibo, Manuel Rosales. Rosales has accused the regional police of engaging in a politically-motivated campaign of intimidation “because the central government in Caracas knows that it is about to lose on November 23.[2] The Chavez administration has threatened to either disqualify or jail him which would remove Mr. Rosales from the political scene. This would make it very difficult for the opposition to have a unified leader to fight the President’s intentions to change the Constitution. In addition when the Comptroller says that the governor of Zulia could be banned for fifteen years from running for office, it means that even if the “corruption” accusations have not been proven, authorities already have formed an opinion as to what the penalty will be.[3] Chavez knows that if Rosales does a good job as he did as governor, he may well challenge him in the next presidential elections.

[1] Chávez's War. November 7, 2008. El Universal, Venezuela.
[2] Chavez government campaign of intimidation seeks to link Zulia Governor Manuel Rosales with State Lottery fraud. October 22, 2008. P-R Inside.

[3] Chavez government campaign of intimidation seeks to link Zulia Governor Manuel Rosales with State Lottery fraud. October 22, 2008. P-R Inside.
“There is a campaign of intimidation, a putrefaction, a dirty war against us in Zulia.” Rosales has said. The authorities are trying to claim that in Zulia a fraud has been committed, but they are grasping allegations out of thin air by linking Manuel Rosales with the bandits and thieves they are, without shame, themselves,” declared Rosales who is being accused of allowing the permanent presence of paramilitaries and arms-traffickers in the State.[1]

When asked about the reasons Chavez feels threatened by him, Rosales responded: “Zulia, both strategically and politically, is the most important state in Venezuela ... it has the largest electoral base ... and they (Chavez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela-PSUV) want to win there taking advantage of the fact that I am stepping down from the governorship. They have lately discovered that Pablo Perez (the opposition candidate to replace Rosales) has a 16 to 20 point advantage in all the surveys. The other thing is that I also remain a candidate for Mayor of Maracaibo, which is, in electoral terms, extremely important, and we have a 42 to 45 point advantage there, too. He (Chavez) sure got angry when we denounced their eagerness to put the Sierra del Perija (the northernmost branch of the Andes, marking the Venezuelan border with Colombia) at the service of the Colombian FARC and, of course, we’ve been unwavering in our criticism of his personal militaristic projects taking place behind a facade of democracy.”[2]

It is clear that the Chavista camp is now worried. Although intimidation and consolidation of his authority has brought him results in the past, at this stage to show this nervousness just days before the elections, seems not to be a strategy but the result of desperation as polls show that the PSUV will lose ground and that Chavez will emerge weaker after November 23. He has even gone so far as to declare that he might send tanks onto the streets in the state of Carabobo if the opposition wins.

Chavez’s tactics are anything but democratic and no international agency, not even the Carter Center, should validate this election as free and fair because it clearly has not been and will not be. This is especially true if the results drastically differ from what the polls show which currently give the opposition a clear lead over the PSUV. It should surprise no one if Rosales is jailed or detained before the elections. November 23rd is an opportunity for Venezuelans to express their disapproval of Chavez and his ever more dictatorial actions. If he is not stopped now, it will become increasingly more difficult to stop him in the future.

*Nicole M. Ferrand is a research analyst and editor of “The Americas Report” of the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center for Security Policy in Washington DC. (www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org). She is a graduate of Columbia University in Economics and Political Science with a background in Law from Peruvian University, UNIFE and in Corporate Finance from Georgetown University.

[1] Ibid.
[2] Ibid.

Thursday, November 6, 2008

The Upcoming Russian – Venezuelan Naval Exercises.

The Upcoming Russian – Venezuelan Naval Exercises.
By Benjamin Miller*
Overview
Russia has dispatched part of its Northern Fleet to the Caribbean for the country’s first ever naval exercises with Venezuela. The exercises, scheduled to take place November 10th-14th, will include a number of Russian and Venezuelan warships. Namely, the nuclear-powered heavy missile cruiser, Peter the Great, as well as the Admiral Chabanenko (an Anti-Submarine Warship) will be directly involved in the exercises. Intentionally ambiguous statements issued by the Russian government allow only for speculation regarding their motives behind the scheduled incursion into the Southern Hemisphere. The departure time of the Russian naval group, however, is peculiarly close to recently voiced Russian grievances about U.S. ships deployed on aid and relief missions in the Black Sea. Indeed, Putin’s prompt warning regarding the U.S. presence, “Our response will be calm, not hysterical, but there will definitely be a response,”[1] supports the notion that there is a significant political message being conveyed to the United States government.
[1] NOVOSTI: Russian News and Information Agency
Political messaging aside, the purposeful nature of Russia’s relationship with Venezuela over the past six years indicates that these naval exercises represent the newest phase of their plan to develop a strategic alliance with the anti-U.S. government of Hugo Chavez. As indicated in last week’s article of the Americas Report, Russian weapons exports to Venezuela have increased substantially over the past 5 years. According to a Jane’s Defense Business Article, the impact of Russian exports on the region is significant:

“Latin America accounted for just 7.7 per cent of Russia's total foreign defense sales during 2006 (according to Moscow's Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies), but Venezuela alone accounted for 16 per cent of all military exports in 2007. Defense and aerospace contracts valued at USD3 billion were signed by the two countries in June 2006 to coincide with a visit to Moscow by Chávez.”[1]

While sources indicate that these specific movements will be oriented towards rescue and communication operations, it is possible that artillery and counter-terrorist training operations could take place as well. Moreover, Venezuelan Defense Minister Gustavo Rangel has said that military cooperation with Russia would prepare Venezuela to face possible U.S. “threats,” citing the reactivation of the U.S. 4th Fleet for Latin America and the Caribbean.[2] This appears to be a logical conclusion given the vast capabilities of the Russian fleet on its way.

Jon Rosamund, editor of Jane's Navy International, makes a good point about the main ship of the Russian fleet heading this way, “On paper it's [Peter the Great] an immensely powerful ship…We are not really sure if this is a show of force or if it poses a viable operational capability at this stage.”
Frank Mora, a Latin America expert at the National Defense University in Washington, also notes that Venezuela has little to contribute to the upcoming exercises. "They have a couple of destroyers, a couple of old submarines, and frigates that can launch surface-to-air missiles -- not anything sophisticated or robust. This would not be a robust exercise. It would be more about indicating strategic cooperation.”[3]
[1] Jane’s, “Russia extends $1bn loan to Venezuela for defense purchases” by Guy Anderson. 9/30/08
[2] Defense News, “Russian Warships Depart for Venezuela Maneuvers”. 9/22/08
[3] CNN: “Russian Ships to Visit Venezuela; Naval Exercises Possible”. 9/9/08
Why is it that Venezuela’s current inability to pose a direct threat to the United States remains a core issue in the discussion pertaining to these naval exercises? For that matter, why has the notion of a Russian nuclear missile cruiser basking in the Caribbean remained unaddressed? Whether or not Venezuela currently has the world-class hardware capable of posing a direct threat to the United States is both irrelevant and distracting. The recent contracts for 5-Kilo-class attack submarines, the other advanced weapons purchases, the talks of shared nuclear energy and oil technology…these are the core issues which should be of concern. The prospect of Russia sponsoring the creation of a nuclear Venezuela in the near future has real-time policy implications and, as indicated in a recent article by The Associated Press, is clearly on the agenda of both governments.

“Russia is ready to support Venezuela in the development of nuclear energy with peaceful purposes and we already have a commission working on it," Chavez said. "We are interested in developing nuclear energy.” [1] If nothing else, November 10th-14th will serve as one more piece of incontrovertible evidence that there is a focused effort by both countries to try to make Venezuela the dominant military power in the region.

In addition to its stop in the Caribbean, it has been speculated that the Russian fleet could stop in Syria as part of a broader show of force in the Mediterranean. Undisclosed sources have indicated that Russian engineers are expanding the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia to serve a more significant strategic purpose, “The possibility of basing aircraft carriers and missile cruisers there is foreseen,” the source told Russian newspaper, Izvestia. It is worth mentioning that the ports in Syria hosted a Soviet naval supply base and served as allies to Moscow during the Cold War. The likelihood of an impromptu port call in Syria has increased considering the recent controversy over the cross-border raids by the U.S. military into Syrian territory.

It is important to point out that the flagrant Russian support for those who would seek to intimidate and harm the U.S. is in no way comparable to our relief efforts underway in the Caucuses. The policy goal of the United States is to promote democracy and freedom among the sovereign peoples of every region, not just those within the former Soviet Union. This is a far cry from Moscow’s policy of supporting non-transparent dictatorships, similar to their own, in its efforts to sabotage true democracy for the purposes of re-establishing its withered sphere of influence. Russia’s provocative responses raise a number of important questions: How deep is the United States willing to allow the Russians to cement themselves in Latin America? How many more naval exercises and weapons shipments will it take for Putin to tip the balance of power in Latin America in his favor? Are the Russians initiating a military buildup similar to the one seen with Cuba in 1962? These are questions which should be carefully analyzed. Hopefully, the United States is not so distracted elsewhere in the world that it ignores this situation and the threat it poses to hemispheric security.





Relevant Russian Naval Specs:
Peter the Great”: Kirov Class (Type 1144.2) Nuclear-Powered Heavy Missile Cruiser.[2]
· 20 Granit anti-ship missiles (500kt nuclear warhead or 750kg HE warhead) [3]
· S-300F Air Defense Missile Complex (96 missiles in 12 vertical launchers),
· Osa-MA autonomous antiaircraft missile system
· Kashtan missile/gun air defense system
· Anti-sub counter measures (20 missiles and 40 rockets)
· 30mm and 130mm artillery batteries.
· Carries two KA-27 helicopters

Admiral Chabanenko”: ASW ship (Anti-Submarine Warfare) [4]
· 2 x 4 Moscit (SS-N-22 anti-air missile)
· 8 x 8 Kinzhal VLS (SA-N-9)
· 2 SA Kortik (SA-N-11)
· Upgraded sonar and defense measures.
· Anti-sub, anti-aircraft, and anti-ship capabilities via various torpedo and missile platforms.
[1] The Associated Press, “Venezuela to build nuclear technology with Russia”. By Christopher Toothaker. 9/28/08
[2] Naval-Technology.com
[3] FAS
[4] Federation of American Scientists
*Benjamin Miller is an intern at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of the University of California San Diego and has a BA in Political Science, with a focus on Latin American and Middle Eastern Affairs.

The Russian – Venezuelan Strategic Alliance.

The Russian – Venezuelan Strategic Alliance.
By Benjamin Miller* with Nancy Menges.*
As relations between the U.S. and Russia have continued to deteriorate, Moscow has increasingly looked for opportunities to get even with Washington. Exactly what prompted this shift in foreign relations can be traced directly to Putin’s concerns pertaining to NATO expansion and American aide relief to former Soviet republics such as Georgia. It is no secret that Russia has continued to sell advanced weapons systems and technology to countries like Libya, Syria, Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and China despite shared intelligence linking several of these governments to illicit trade and terror networks. Likewise, one need only follow the money trail to see that Russia has now set its sights on Latin America and particularly on Venezuela.
According to the National Budget Office, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has tripled his country’s defense budget since 2000 to a whopping$3.3 billion in 2008. Chavez's biggest purchases from Russia came in 2006 when, in that year alone, he signed deals for over $3 billion in weapons.[1] Between 2004 and 2005 Venezuela
doubled the value of the major conventional weapons it imported from$13million to $27million.

This number then sky-rocketed to $406 million over the next 12 months, causing Venezuela to surpass other nations such as Argentina, France, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan in the index.[1] The large majority of the weapons it received came directly from Russia.

History has shown that oil-based power politics can be used as a valuable weapon. Both Putin and Chavez understand this better than anyone, for it is these very tactics that allow them to consolidate and maintain power at home while projecting power abroad.
Russia’s petro-giants, GAZPROM and LUKOIL, along with Venezuela’s PDVSA, recently agreed to form what will be the largest oil consortium in the world.[1] The deal includes the joint exploration of untapped Venezuelan oil fields in addition to shared crude-oil refining technology. The plan is for Russia to build two oil refineries in Venezuela.
This is very much in line with Mr. Chavez’s pronouncements that he wants to find markets for his oil other than having to depend principally on the U.S. as his main buyer. Since China is also in the process of building three refineries in China to process Venezuelan crude, Chavez’s goal of cutting off the United States might be possible in three to five years. As proven by the OPEC crisis of 1973, oil and other natural resources can, and will be used as weapons by those who would cripple the global economy in an attempt to put a squeeze on the United States. By equipping leaders like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez with the military and economic means by which to dominate entire regions and their subsequent markets, Russia is positioning itself to cause massive hemorrhaging in our hemispheric security structure.

The Hardware
Scholars continue to draw similarities between recent Chavez-Putin brokered military deals and those struck by Castro and Gorbachev in October of 1962. While it may be argued that any strategic threat comparison of the two scenarios is an elastic one at best, the substance of such an argument is limited to the specific weapons capabilities of the respective hardware involved.

To date Russia has sold Venezuela[1]:
· Twenty-four Su-30MK fighter jets[2]
· Fifty or more military helicopters (Mi-17’s, Mi-35’s, Mi-26’s)[3]
· At least five Kilo-Class attack submarines[4]
· 100,000 AK-47’s as well as rights to a manufacturing facility[5]
[1] All figures were confirmed through the Library of Congress using the databases from
*The Military Balance 2008. Published by Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies
*SIPRI Yearbook 2007, “Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security”. Oxford University Press 2007.
In addition to the pending delivery of Tor-M1 surface-to-air missile systems, the most recent meeting between the two countries coincided with Russian military exercises showcasing the deployment of the Tochka (Scarab-1) short range ballistic missile platform for President Chavez. If there are doubts about Russian ability or intent to sell this type of hardware, one need only look at their transaction records with nations like Iran and Syria. The delivery of 29 Tor-M1 systems to Iran was the most controversial export of 2006[1] and Syria has already purchased multiple Scarab-1 platforms[2]. This meeting yielded a $1billion Venezuelan line of credit with which to buy other Russian armaments. Additionally, Russia has promised Venezuela a large order of T-72 Main Battle Tanks and BMP-3 armored infantry combat vehicles. While these weapons platforms are incapable of deploying nuclear payloads against the continental U.S., they greatly enhance Venezuela’s ability to launch conventional attacks and ultimately to attain regional military dominance.

Chavez’s Plan
Chavez is a cunning and rational adversary. Both his long and short term agendas to uproot opposition to his control of the Venezuelan economy, military, and political system are clear in light of his ongoing efforts at military consolidation and constitutional reform. While he remains adamantly anti-American in his policies, the Venezuelan leader is well aware that a direct attack against the United States would be political and military suicide. Chavez understands that operating under the auspices of Russia provides him increased elasticity in dealing with the United States, and it would be unwise to place Venezuela in a situation where it could be left isolated and devoid of fruitful international allies such as Russia and China. It is logical then, to deduce that Chavez’s new arsenal is intended to augment his broader hegemonic strategy in the region as a tool of coercion.

That being said, U.S. military personnel operating out of regional drug-trafficking monitoring locations and more permanent forward operating locations (FOLs) are significantly more vulnerable as a result of these weapons. These tactical anchors play a vital role in U.S. counter-terrorism and narco-trafficking operations in the region, and are on the verge of collapse. It is definite that the U.S. base at Manta, Ecuador will not be renewed by the Correa government when our lease there expires in 2009. Of the other two U.S. FOLs in the region, it is likely that the one in Honduras will be removed because of their recent turn towards more Chavista like policies. The simple truth of the matter is that a growing Russian-Venezuelan strategic alliance, when combined with a potential decrease of United States regional influence, is directly affecting American hemispheric security interests. To our regional allies such as Colombia, who has been fighting against a forty year long FARC insurgency and is actively engaged in the fight for democracy, the Venezuelan-Russian threat is an imminent one.

*Benjamin Miller is an intern at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of the University of California San Diego and has a BA in Political Science, with a focus on Latin American and Middle Eastern Affairs.

* Nancy Menges is co-founder of the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center and Editor-in-Chief of the Americas Report.

[1] The Military Balance 2008, “Russia: Arms Trade”. Pp 210.
[2] Defense and Security (Russia)


[2] http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/su_30mk/index.html
[3] Defense and Security (Russia), “Luring Chavez…” September 29th, 2008. Taken from LexisNexis.com
[4] http://www.nti.org/db/submarines/russia/export.html, “Russia Export Behavior”.
[5] NTI: “Russia Export Behavior”.
[1] Business News Americas

[1] SIPRI Yearbook 2007, “Armaments, Disarmament and International Security”. Oxford University Press 2007. Page 419 Table 10A.1

Monday, October 6, 2008

China’s Control of the Panama Canal Revisited.

China’s Control of the Panama Canal Revisited.
By Yojiro Konno with Nancy Menges.
China’s increasing influence in the Western Hemisphere has been of growing interest to lawmakers on Capitol Hill. In fact, on June 11, 2008, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a hearing entitled “The New Challenge: China in the Western Hemisphere.”[i] In the hearing, experts on Latin America pointed out that total trade between China and the Latin American and Caribbean region skyrocketed from $8.2 billion to $102 billion in less than ten years. Furthermore, those testifying mentioned that Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to several Latin American countries in 2004 underscored China’s increased presence in the hemisphere. During his visit, Hu stated that China would invest $100 billion in the region over the next decade.
Over the past years, several Latin American countries that had no diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China have now established them. For instance, in 2007, Costa Rica aborted its ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, primarily for economic and financial reasons.[i] However, the most important indicator of China’s growing influence is its control over the ports at both ends of the Panama Canal. China has been operating these ports since 2000 and their influence inside Panama has grown as indicated by a bill submitted last year to the legislature that mandates teaching Mandarin in all Panamanian public schools.[ii]
Currently the Panama Ports Company,[i] a subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa Ltd.,[ii] has exclusive and extensive rights to control both ends of the Panama Canal. Hutchison Whampoa is a Chinese company owned by Hong Kong billionaire, Li Ka-Shing, who has strong ties with Beijing. Considering Li’s close ties with the Chinese government, it is highly plausible that Hutchison Whampoa has the potential to act as Beijing’s political agent and that their possession of the ports at either end of the Panama Canal constitutes a serious U.S. national security issue.
[i] Panama Ports Company Official Website (http://www.ppc.com.pa/index_eng.php)
[ii] Official website of Hutchison Whampoa clearly mentions that Panama Ports Company is a subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa (http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/eng/ports/international/the_americas.htm)
Over the past years, several Latin American countries that had no diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China have now established them. For instance, in 2007, Costa Rica aborted its ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, primarily for economic and financial reasons.[i] However, the most important indicator of China’s growing influence is its control over the ports at both ends of the Panama Canal. China has been operating these ports since 2000 and their influence inside Panama has grown as indicated by a bill submitted last year to the legislature that mandates teaching Mandarin in all Panamanian public schools.[ii]

Currently the Panama Ports Company,[iii] a subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa Ltd.,[iv] has exclusive and extensive rights to control both ends of the Panama Canal. Hutchison Whampoa is a Chinese company owned by Hong Kong billionaire, Li Ka-Shing, who has strong ties with Beijing. Considering Li’s close ties with the Chinese government, it is highly plausible that Hutchison Whampoa has the potential to act as Beijing’s political agent and that their possession of the ports at either end of the Panama Canal constitutes a serious U.S. national security issue.
Brief Overview of the History of Panama Canal
The Panama Canal was established in 1914 under the leadership of the United States. The Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty in 1903 granted a right to the United States to build and administer the canal and the surrounding areas indefinitely. However, because this treaty was signed without the consent of the Panamanians, it became a contentious diplomatic issue between Panama and the United States. The Panamanian dissatisfaction toward U.S. control over the Canal Zone reached a peak in January of 1964, when riots over sovereignty of the Canal Zone broke out. Responding to such protests, in 1977 President Carter signed the Neutrality Treaty and the Panama Canal Treaty. Under the Neutrality Treaty, Panama became obliged to guarantee the neutrality of the Canal Zone. In exchange, under the Panama Canal Treaty, the US promised to withdraw from the Canal Zone by the end of 1999 and guaranteed that Panama would assume full sovereignty over the area in 2000.

Hutchison Whampoa’s Control over the Panama Canal and Panama Law No.5
However, in 1996, Panama decided to auction the rights to manage the canal to a private company. Despite the fact that the Chinese company’s bid came in fourth after the Japanese firm, Kawasaki/I.T.S., the U.S. firm, Bechtel, and the Panamanian American company, M.I.T,[i] Panama awarded the contract to China’s Hutchinson Whampoa. A published report claimed that “Panama preemptively closed the bidding, secretly changed the rules,” and “simply awarded the contract to Hutchison Whampoa.”[ii] According to Constantine Menges, who headed the Latin American desk at the NSC during the Reagan Administration, “China was determined to win the bidding process and used corrupt means to influence the government of Panama in its favor.”[iii] In fact, a 1996 cable to the U.S. Embassy in Panama reported that just before the bidding, Beijing gave $400 million to Hutchison Whampoa through a state-run investment company, China Resources Enterprise,[iv] a company which was identified by Senator Fred Thompson as “an agent of espionage—economic, military, and political—for China” and “has reportedly served as an intelligence-collection front for China.”[v] William J. Hughes, the U.S. ambassador to Panama, and Senator Trent Lott objected to the ‘unorthodox’ bidding process and called for an investigation, but in vain. (See “The Americas Report” April 10, 2008. Article by Nicole M. Ferrand.)

Thus in January of 1997, through a state-contract called “Panama Law No.5,”[vi] Panama officially granted the right to control the canal[vii] to Hutchison Whampoa. Panama Law No. 5 also promised that at the end of the Panama Canal Treaty, “the areas, facilities, and installations” occupied by the Panama Canal Commission and the United States shall be turned over to Hutchison Whampoa (Clause 2.23.g). In other words, Hutchison Whampoa controls not only the ports at both ends of the canal, but also the surrounding areas the United States used to control, including the former U.S. Rodman Naval Station (Clause 2.1) and the former U.S. Albrook Air Force Base.[viii] The length of the lease to Hutchinson Whampoa is 25 years with an automatic renewal for another 25 years (Clause 2.9).

According to Panama Law No.5, Panama gave extensive and exclusive rights to Hutchison Whampoa. The document says, “During the life of this contract and its extension, THE COMPANY shall have the exclusive right to develop, construct, operate, administer and manage THE Ports”[ix] (Emphasis added). Hutchison Whampoa’s rights include: a right to “fence in, at any time, and entirely at its discretion, the area referred to here in as the Bonded Area[x] (Clause 2.1)”; a right to “subcontract all of its rights and activities granted by this concession contract, without the need for approval by THE STATE”; and a right to “carry out operations, transactions, negotiations, and activities in general, be they local or international, with any person or public, private or mixed entity.” That is, taking such extensive rights into accounts, it seems possible for Hutchison Whampoa to host and hide Chinese spying activities in the Canal Zone.

Hutchison Whampoa and Owner Li Ka-Shing’s Connections with Beijing
The owner of Hutchison Whampoa, Li Ka-Shing, has extensive ties with Beijing. In fact, a government document explicitly mentioned that Li “has significant economic and political ties to China.”[xi] For instance, Li and a son of the former Chinese President Jiang Zemin are jointly developing real estate properties inside Tiananmen Square for the communist party.[xii] In addition, in 1994, the Clinton administration provided Li’s bio, along with the bios of the top communist leaders, to the CEO of Loral Aerospace prior to the Ron Brown trade trip to Beijing;[xiii] Li was the only civilian included in the bios.[xiv] Li has also helped the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) purchase satellites in the past and mediated several satellite deals between the U.S. Hughes Corporation and China Hong Kong Satellite (ChinaSat),[xv]a company owned by the Chinese Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.[xvi] One U.S. government document stated that Li Ka-Shing “is willing to use his business influence to further the aims of the Chinese government.”[xvii]

A report by the RAND Corporation in 1997 pointed out that Li Ka-Shing was negotiating for PLA wireless system contracts.[xviii] Li was also a member of the board of directors of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), [xix] a bank of the Chinese army that provides money for Chinese weapon sales and Western technology purchases.[xx] Indeed, William Triplett, co-author of Red Dragon Rising, described Li as “the Banker for the Chinese Military.”[xxi] The fact that Hutchison has exclusive contracts with the state-owned China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) also suggests that Li Ka-Shing has a close relationship with Beijing.[xxii] COSCO is known for its failed attempts to acquire the former Long Beach Naval station in California.[xxiii] Furthermore, according to a RAND report, a COSCO ship attempted to smuggle over 2,000 fully automatic machine guns into the United States in 1996.[xxiv]

In 1991, Li Ka-Shing also attempted to gain control over Subic Bay, a strategic port in the Philippines that had been vacated by the United States. Due to warnings from U.S. Marine Corps personnel, Philippine President Ramos vetoed Hutchinson's take over of Subic Bay and Li Ka-Shing was unable to obtain the port.[xxv]

In 2003, Li attempted to take over the largest U.S. telecommunications company, Global Crossing Ltd. According to the New York Times,[xxvi] Global Crossing once agreed to make a deal with Hutchison Whampoa. However, Hutchison Whampoa decided to withdraw from the bid a few days after a review committee of foreign investment in U.S. companies announced that it had begun an investigation of the deal. Because a Chinese company with strong connections with Beijing was about to buy communication networks used by the federal government and other critical private sectors, members of congress and some governmental officials had raised national security concerns. Global Crossing provides services to the federal government, more than 35 percent of Fortune 500 companies, 700 carriers, mobile companies, and internet service providers.[xxvii] Global Crossing controls 20 percent of all the fiber-optic cable in the United States and is a major bidder for U.S. Defense communications contracts.[xxviii] Given Li Ka-Shing’s close ties with Beijing, as well as his attempts to control important U.S. infrastructure and a strategically important port in the Philippines it should make those responsible for U.S. national security question the national security implications of Hutchison Whampoa’s control over the Panama Canal.

In addition, Beijing seems to treat Li Ka-Shing in a special manner. For example, Beijing has given Li exclusive rights of first refusal over all mainland Chinese ports south of the Yangtze River. “This involves a close working relationship with the Chinese military and businesses controlled by the People’s Liberation Army,” said Al Santoli, a former national security advisor to the House of Representatives.[xxix] Further, Li’s bio provided by the Clinton Administration mentioned that Li was convicted of insider trading in 1984 but never punished.[xxx]
National Security Implications of Chinese Control of the Panama Canal
Now that Hutchison Whampoa controls both ends of the Panama Canal there are three major national security concerns that come to mind. These include; possible covert Chinese spying activities, strategic denial in the case of a serious conflict between China and the U.S., and strengthened Chinese political power that could threaten U.S. national interests. First, since Hutchison Whampoa has exclusive rights over the canal areas as Panama Law No.5 guarantees, the Chinese company could easily provide cover for Chinese espionage. This concern becomes more realistic when one considers China’s recent spying activities[i] and Li’s special relationships with Beijing and the PLA.

Secondly, in the event of a serious military conflict with the United States, such as one over Taiwan, it would be highly possible for Beijing to use Hutchison Whampoa to effectively interrupt U.S. intervention. As former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger puts it, Hutchison Whampoa’s control of the canal is a national security threat because “The Company would not be able to survive if they don’t do something the Chinese government tells them to.”[ii] Admiral Moore, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claims that in case of military conflict in the Pacific, a large number of logistic ships need uninterrupted access to the canal to support deployed forces.[iii] If the use of the canal were denied, those ships would need to travel an extra 9,000 miles around South America and would not be able to sustain combat effectiveness in the Pacific.[iv] “It is not ‘managing traffic’ under normal circumstances with which I am concerned,” said Moore, “it is the ability of a potential enemy to disrupt traffic so as to block military supply, which in times of conflict is 80 to 90 percent dependent upon sea lift capability for there to be any sustained forward effort.”[v] It is also important to remember that Chinese denial of the use of the canal would significantly damage the U.S. economy; the United States is the largest user of the canal and 15-20 percent of total U.S. trade, including 40 percent of grain exports and 670,000 barrels of oil per day, come through the canal. [vi]

Chinese Control of the Panama Canal as Part of a Larger Global Strategy
Third and most importantly, Chinese control of the canal is only part of a larger Beijing strategy to strengthen its geo-strategic positioning around the globe. The Center for Security Policy reported in 2002 that China is working hard to acquire strategic “choke points” around the world, including the Caribbean’s Bahamas, Subic Bay in the Philippines, the Mediterranean’s Malt, the Persian Gulf’s Straits of Hormuz, the Panama Canal[vii], and even cyberspace,[viii] outer space, and U.S. telecommunications.[ix] In addition, on April 20, 2008, “The Americas Report” stated that Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Port Holdings (HPH) had expressed interest in the Manta Port in Ecuador. In October, 2006 HPH gave a 1 million dollar bond to the Manta Port Authority and in November, 2006, HPH was the only final bidder and the Manta Port Authority (MPA) gave HPH operating concessions in exchange for $486 million (added to $55 million promised by the MPA) to upgrade facilities over the next 30 years. Hutchinson Port Holdings is the port-operating subsidiary of Hong Kong’s Hutchison-Whampoa which in 2001 bought out Philippines-based port operator ICTSI, which had various Latin American interests in Argentina, Mexico and the Bahamas. Manta is a desirable port for HPH as it is the closest port to Asia on Latin America’s west coast. Also, Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. has a significant presence at the Lazaro Cardenas seaport in Mexico, as well as other Mexican ports. China has been very effective in securing strategic locations which they clearly understand will give them the upper hand in the event of any future confrontation with the U.S.

Therefore, strengthened Chinese strategic positioning has U.S. national security implications, as conflicts with China are foreseeable. The Congressional Research Service has reported that China has three main long-term goals which include “asserting China’s regional military leadership while displacing U.S. regional military influence, prevailing in regional rivalries, and encouraging eventual U.S. military withdrawal from the region [Western Pacific].”[x] These goals are clearly incompatible with U.S. national security interests.[xi] The Taiwan situation and competition over natural resources could also lead to conflicts in the future.

To conclude our loss of the Panama Canal was a major strategic blunder by the Carter Administration that was followed up in 1997 by the Clinton Administration’s failure to assure that the bidding process was open and fair. Since China, through Hutchison Whampoa, now has almost total sovereignty over the Canal, the Neutrality Treaty agreed to by President Carter has little significance in terms of protecting future U.S. interests. In the event of a future conflict between China and the U.S., it will be China not Panama that will be calling the shots. (Please find footnotes at the end of the Report).
* Yojiro Konno is a senior sociology major at Grinnell College, IA. He is interested in public policy and is currently an intern at the Center for Security Policy.

*Nancy Menges is co-founder of the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center and Editor-in-Chief of the Americas Report.

[i] Demetri Sevastopulo. Feb. 11, 2008. “Four arrested in US-China spy cases.” Financial Times. (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c0a576d0-d8cd-11dc-8b22-0000779fd2ac.html)
[ii] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 397
[iii] Ed Oliver and Joseph Farah. November 9, 1998. “The Panama Canal debate rages: Admiral, ambassador square off in Senate testimony.” WorldNetDaily. (http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=16790)
[iv] Ed Oliver. October 18, 1998. “Admiral: I see big trouble in Panama.” WorldNetDaily. (http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=16751)
[v] Ed Oliver and Joseph Farah. November 9, 1998. “The Panama Canal debate rages: Admiral, ambassador square off in Senate testimony.” WorldNetDaily. (http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=16790)
[vi] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 396
[vii]The Center for Security Policy, cited in Slate Magazine Online. July 9, 2008. (http://fray.slate.com/discuss/forums/post/1357239.aspx)
[viii] “China’s Cyber-Militia” May 31, 2008. National Journal (http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/print_friendly.php?ID=cs_20080531_6948)
[ix] Glater, Jonathon D. May 1, 2003. “TECHNOLOGY; Hong Kong Partner Quits Joint Bid for Global Crossing.” New York Times.
[x] Ronald O’Rourke Page 44. “CRS Report for Congress: China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service.
[xi] Dr. Richard Weixing Hu, a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution, too, mentions that China wants the U.S. withdraw from East Asia at the event “Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy in East Asia” on June 3, 2008 (http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0603_cnaps.aspx)

[i] EagleForum.org. 1999. “Red China: Gatekeeper of the Panama Canal.” (http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/1999/nov99/psrnov99.html)
[ii] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 397.
[iii] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 397.
[iv] Smith, Charles R. February 12, 2002. “Chinese Billionaire Wants Global Crossing.” NewsMax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/2/11/184102.shtml)
[v]Smith, Charles R. August 6, 2002. “Li Ka-Shing Seeks U.S. Contract.” NewsMax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/8/5/181935.shtml)
[vi] Actual Texts from American Defense Center (http://www.americandefensecenter.org/documents.aspx) and ConservativeUSA (http://www.conservativeusa.org/panamalaw5.htm)
[vii] The document calls the two ports (Balboa and Cristobal) and surrounding areas combined as “The Existing Ports”
[viii] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 397.
[ix] “The Ports” in the document includes lands, facilities, and installations of “The Existing Ports” as well as “The Future Extension.”
[x] “The Bonded Area”: combined areas of “The Existing Ports” and “The Future Extension”
[xi] SoftWar. June 24, 2008. “Li Ka-Shing.” (http://www.softwar.net/kashing.html)
[xii] Smith, Charles R. August 6. 2002. “Li Ka-Shing Seeks U.S. Contract.” NewsMax (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/8/5/181935.shtml)
[xiii] SoftWar. June 24, 2008. “Li Ka-Shing.” (http://www.softwar.net/kashing.html)
[xiv] Smith, Charles R. August 6. 2002. “Li Ka-Shing Seeks U.S. Contract.” NewsMax.
[xv] Smith, Charles R. August 6. 2002. “Li Ka-Shing Seeks U.S. Contract.” NewsMax
[xvi] Federation of American Scientists. June 20, 1998. “Zhongxing / Chinasat.” (http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/comm/chinasat.htm)
[xvii] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 397.
[xviii]SoftWar. July 9, 2008. “Rand Corporation Report Chinese Military Commerce and U.S. National Security.” (http://www.softwar.net/rand.html)
Smith, Charles R. February 12, 2002. “Chinese Billionaire Wants Global Crossing.” Newsmax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/2/11/184102.shtml)
[xix] SoftWar. June 24, 2008. (http://www.softwar.net/kashing.html)
[xx] Smith, Charles R. February 27, 2003. “Global Double Crossing.” NewsMax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/2/26/182009.shtml)
[xxi] Smith, Charles. December 8, 1999. “‘Dirty’ War in Panama.” (http://ads.wnd.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=17277)
[xxii] Smith, Charles R. March 6, 2003. “Billionaire Fails in Bid for Global Crossing.” NewMax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/3/5/162452.shtml)
[xxiii] Smith, Charles R. March 6, 2003. “Billionaire Fails in Bid for Global Crossing” NewsMax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/3/5/162452.shtml)
[xxiv] SoftWar. July 9, 2008. “Rand Corporation Report Chinese Military Commerce and U.S. National Security.” (http://www.softwar.net/rand.html)
Smith, Charles. May 25, 1999. “Chinagate's smoking gun.” WorldNetDaily. (http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/access/29879182.html?dids=29879182:29879182&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Jun+02%2C+1998&author=PAUL+RICHTER&pub=Los+Angeles+Times&desc=Long+Beach+Deal+Put+in+Jeopardy+by+China+Fears&pqatl=google)
[xxv] Smith, Charles. May 25, 1998. “The Panama-China connection: Port company at canal has close ties to Lippo group” The World Net Daily. (http://www.worldnetdaily.com/index.php?pageId=3251)
[xxvi] Glater, Jonathon D. May 1, 2003. “TECHNOLOGY; Hong Kong Partner Quits Joint Bid for Global Crossing.” New York Times. (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05E2DD1F3DF932A35756C0A9659C8B63 )
[xxvii] Global Crossing Official Website. July 8, 2008. “About us” (http://www.globalcrossing.com/company/company_landing.aspx)
[xxviii] Smith, Charles R. February 12, 2002. “Chinese Billionaire Wants Global Crossing.” NewsMax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/2/11/184102.shtml)
[xxix] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 397
[xxx] SoftWar. “Li Ka-Shing.” (http://www.softwar.net/kashing.html)

[i] Edward Cody. July 9, 2007. “China's Diplomatic Gain Is Taiwan's Loss” Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/08/AR2007070801065_pf.html)
[ii] BBC News. December 7, 2007. “Panama schools to teach Chinese.” BBC. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/mobile/bbc_news/world/americas/713/71312/story7131205.shtml?page_id=16)
[iii] Panama Ports Company Official Website (http://www.ppc.com.pa/index_eng.php)
[iv] Official website of Hutchison Whampoa clearly mentions that Panama Ports Company is a subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa (http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/eng/ports/international/the_americas.htm)

[i] Edward Cody. July 9, 2007. “China's Diplomatic Gain Is Taiwan's Loss” Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/08/AR2007070801065_pf.html)
[ii] BBC News. December 7, 2007. “Panama schools to teach Chinese.” BBC. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/mobile/bbc_news/world/americas/713/71312/story7131205.shtml?page_id=16)


[i] House Committee of Foreign Affairs. June 11, 2008. “New Challenge: China in the Western Hemisphere.” (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1004)

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

Venezuela’s Tarek El - Aissami

Venezuela’s Tarek El - Aissami
By Nicole M. Ferrand*

Since our inception two years ago, we have been following the growing relationship between Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Although most of the information available in the media states that this relationship started in 2005, it actually began as soon as Chavez started his mandate in 1999. In fact, on November 19, 2007, the Iranian reformist newspaper, E’temad-e-Melli, published an article claiming that relations between Tehran and Caracas began with the formation of the (Iranian) Reformist government when former President Muhammed Khatami visited Venezuela during his time in office. They became so close that in 2005 Chavez presented the Iranian leader with the highest decoration, the Order of the Liberator, as a symbol of their strong ties.[1]
The Venezuelan President then encouraged Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega to develop ties with Iranian President Ahmadinejad which they did. All four of these countries now have strong ties to Iran and have signed treaties in diverse areas of the economy. In exchange, Iran has received many benefits including a strong presence in the Hemisphere as well as support from Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador against UN sanctions. Although insiders claim that Iran had no interest in developing relationships with Caracas, per se, Khatami’s regime was under international pressure to make new alliances among non-aligned countries. In the Middle East, Tehran had strong ties with Syria and Qatar, but it did not have any base from where they could actually threaten the United States and that is when Caracas became of interest.[2] After learning of Chavez’s leadership in the Hemisphere, Tehran planned a strategy to establish itself in nations under the Venezuelan leader’s influence.

Manuchehr Honarmand was a witness to the developing Iranian-Venezuelan relationship. Mr. Honarmand is a Dutch citizen who used to write columns for the opposition daily Kayhan International, based in London. An Iranian dissident journalist, Honarmand decided to go to the US to expand the newspaper’s distribution. In December 2002 he visited South America for tourism and while in transit at the Caracas airport, waiting for a connecting flight, he was approached by two Iranians who asked him to provide information about himself. They were soon joined by two Venezuelan policemen.[3]

After learning who he was, they handcuffed him and brought him to an office behind the transit area where he was beaten and forced to sign papers in Spanish, which he did not understand. A few hours later, Honarmand was thrown into a cell where he was told that he had been charged with drug trafficking.

Furthermore, he was refused contact with the Dutch Embassy. A Venezuelan National Guard report stated that his “drug - filled suitcase” was found in a Copa Airlines flight even though Honarmand had been traveling on KLM.[4]

Mr. Honarmand’s luggage, money and papers were stolen and his Dutch passport was confiscated by the Venezuelan police. While he was in jail, he was able to contact Houshang Vaziri, his editor in chief, who promised to help but soon disappeared and was later found dead in Paris. Honarmand was freed in 2005, thanks to the Dutch government’s pressures. During his time in Caracas he spoke with discontented insiders of Chavez’s regime who informed him about the presence of Iranian officials in every sector of the economy and that they occupied high positions in the National Guard and the police. They also told Honarmand that Iranian officials are actually proselytizing in the poorest sectors of Venezuelan society to attract followers.[5] However, what has many insiders worried is the possibility of radicals holding government positions. The recent designation of Tarek El – Aissami as Minster of Interior and Justice of Venezuela has raised concerns because of his connections with extremist groups.

Mr. El – Aissami is a Venezuelan national of Syrian descent who, before becoming Minster of Interior and Justice, occupied the position of Deputy Interior Minister for Public Security. His father, Carlos Aissami, is the head of the Venezuelan branch of the Iraqi Baath political party. Before the invasion of Iraq, he held a press conference in which he described himself as a Taliban and called Osama Bin Laden, “the great Mujahedeen, Sheik Osama bin Laden.” Tarek’s great-uncle Shibli el-Aissami was a prominent ideologist and assistant to the party’s secretary general in Baghdad during the Saddam Hussein regime.[1]

It was discovered that in 2003 El Aissami was appointed, along with another radical student leader from the University of the Andes in the city of Mérida, Hugo Cabezas, to head the country’s passport and naturalization service, the Onidex (Identification and Immigration Office). The choice came as a surprise precisely because of their ties with guerrilla movements at Universidad de Los Andes (ULA). Evidence has surfaced that during this time both men illegally issued Venezuelan passports and identity documents to members of Hezbollah and Hamas. Mr. Cabezas is now the government candidate for governor of the Andean state of Trujillo in elections due to be held on November 23, 2008 and is a founding member of Utopia, an armed group that has connections with the Bolivarian Liberation Front.[2]

While a student leader at ULA, Aissami had political control of the university residences (dorms), which were used to hide stolen vehicles and conduct drug deals and had managed to get members of the guerillas into the dorms. According to reports, of the 1,122 people living in one of the University’s residences, only 387 were active students and more than 600 had nothing to do with the university.[3]

Venezuelan investigative journalist, Patricia Poleo, who escaped Venezuela and currently lives in Miami says that Mr. Aissami together with others affiliated with Hezbollah, such as Lebanon-born Gahzi Nasserddine, currently the Business Liaison at the Venezuelan embassy in Damascus, and his brother, Ghasan Atef Salameh Nasserddi, are in charge of recruiting young Venezuelan Arabs affiliated with the ‘Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela’ or PSUV (Chavez’s Socialist Party), to be sent to South Lebanon for combat training in Hezbollah camps preparing them for ‘asymmetrical war’ against the United States. Once back in Venezuela, they are greeted by radical members of the Venezuelan Socialist Party affiliated with UNEFA (the university run by the Armed Forces) and the Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela (Venezuelan Bolivarian University) and continue with their training in firearms, explosives and munitions. The training camps are located in the states of Monagas, Miranda, el Páramo, Falcon, Yaracuy, Yumare, and Trujillo and the districts of Maturin, Los Teques, El Jari, Churuguara and Sierra de San Luis. These groups and individuals are supervised by the Hezbollah Organization in Venezuela, along with al-Qaeda Iraqis currently living in the country and by the Palestinian Democratic Front, headed by Salid Ahmed Rahman, whose office is located in Caracas’s Central Park.[4]

Since Chavez assumed the Presidency, Hezbollah, Hamas and al-Qaeda have used Venezuela as their bridge to other Latin American countries. There is information that a group of Iraqi activists belonging to al-Qaeda are currently in Caracas. Their names are: Mohammed Adnan Yasin, Falah Amin Taha and Muhi Alwan Mohammed Al Qaisi. They all arrived in Caracas with temporary visas granted and approved by the heads of Onidex (Cabezas and Aissami) and are believed to be very dangerous. They oversee the activities of these terrorist organizations in the tri – border region, and in Nicaragua and Argentina.[5]

Other Hezbollah members in Venezuela with these same visas are: explosives expert Lebanese Abdul Ghani Suleiman Wanked, Hassan Nasrallah’s right-hand man.; Rada Ramel Assad, born in Barranquilla, Colombia and Abouchanab Daichoum Dani who is the organizer of the group.[6]
We have to be very careful about what is going on in Venezuela. Independent media outlets have warned that the Chávez regime was issuing ID documents to Islamic radicals, enabling them to operate and move freely to other countries. It is extremely worrisome and dangerous to appoint a radical such as Aissami as the official in charge of issuing identity cards and passports but this serves the goals of the Iranian and Venezuelan presidents in their joint efforts to radicalize the region and build terrorist networks.

Other articles written by the staff of The America’s Report that can be referenced to in relation with this story are: “The Iranian threat already in the US’ backyard”, February 14, 2008 by Nicole M. Ferrand; “Latin America’s radical grassroots”, by Luis Fleischman and Nicole M. Ferrand from March 27, 2007; “The Radical Grassroots in Latin America II”, by Luis Fleischman and Nicole M. Ferrand from April 11, 2007; “The Latin American Radical Grassroots III”, by Luis Fleischman and Nicole M. Ferrand).

*Nicole M. Ferrand is the editor of “The Americas Report” of the Menges Hemispheric Security Project. She is a graduate of Columbia University in Economics and Political Science with a background in Law from Peruvian University, UNIFE and in Corporate Finance from Georgetown University.

[1] Al Arabiya – Ibid.
[2] Jihad in Venezuela. November 29, 2003. Jihad Watch.
[3] Memri – Ibid.
[4] Hezbollah and Al Qaeda in Venezuela. June 12, 2008 The Jungle Hut.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid,
[1] Ibid.
[2] Ibid.
[3] The Iran-Venezuela Connection. February 14, 2008. Memri.
[4] Ibid.

[1] Unholy alliance between Caracas and Tehran. January 13, 2008. Al Arabiya News.