China’s Control of the Panama Canal Revisited.

China’s Control of the Panama Canal Revisited.
By Yojiro Konno with Nancy Menges.

China’s increasing influence in the Western Hemisphere has been of growing interest to lawmakers on Capitol Hill. In fact, on June 11, 2008, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a hearing entitled “The New Challenge: China in the Western Hemisphere.”[i] In the hearing, experts on Latin America pointed out that total trade between China and the Latin American and Caribbean region skyrocketed from $8.2 billion to $102 billion in less than ten years. Furthermore, those testifying mentioned that Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to several Latin American countries in 2004 underscored China’s increased presence in the hemisphere. During his visit, Hu stated that China would invest $100 billion in the region over the next decade.

Over the past years, several Latin American countries that had no diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China have now established them. For instance, in 2007, Costa Rica aborted its ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, primarily for economic and financial reasons.[i] However, the most important indicator of China’s growing influence is its control over the ports at both ends of the Panama Canal. China has been operating these ports since 2000 and their influence inside Panama has grown as indicated by a bill submitted last year to the legislature that mandates teaching Mandarin in all Panamanian public schools.[ii]

Currently the Panama Ports Company,[i] a subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa Ltd.,[ii] has exclusive and extensive rights to control both ends of the Panama Canal. Hutchison Whampoa is a Chinese company owned by Hong Kong billionaire, Li Ka-Shing, who has strong ties with Beijing. Considering Li’s close ties with the Chinese government, it is highly plausible that Hutchison Whampoa has the potential to act as Beijing’s political agent and that their possession of the ports at either end of the Panama Canal constitutes a serious U.S. national security issue.
[i] Panama Ports Company Official Website (http://www.ppc.com.pa/index_eng.php)
[ii] Official website of Hutchison Whampoa clearly mentions that Panama Ports Company is a subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa (http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/eng/ports/international/the_americas.htm)

Over the past years, several Latin American countries that had no diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China have now established them. For instance, in 2007, Costa Rica aborted its ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, primarily for economic and financial reasons.[i] However, the most important indicator of China’s growing influence is its control over the ports at both ends of the Panama Canal. China has been operating these ports since 2000 and their influence inside Panama has grown as indicated by a bill submitted last year to the legislature that mandates teaching Mandarin in all Panamanian public schools.[ii]

Currently the Panama Ports Company,[iii] a subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa Ltd.,[iv] has exclusive and extensive rights to control both ends of the Panama Canal. Hutchison Whampoa is a Chinese company owned by Hong Kong billionaire, Li Ka-Shing, who has strong ties with Beijing. Considering Li’s close ties with the Chinese government, it is highly plausible that Hutchison Whampoa has the potential to act as Beijing’s political agent and that their possession of the ports at either end of the Panama Canal constitutes a serious U.S. national security issue.

Brief Overview of the History of Panama Canal
The Panama Canal was established in 1914 under the leadership of the United States. The Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty in 1903 granted a right to the United States to build and administer the canal and the surrounding areas indefinitely. However, because this treaty was signed without the consent of the Panamanians, it became a contentious diplomatic issue between Panama and the United States. The Panamanian dissatisfaction toward U.S. control over the Canal Zone reached a peak in January of 1964, when riots over sovereignty of the Canal Zone broke out. Responding to such protests, in 1977 President Carter signed the Neutrality Treaty and the Panama Canal Treaty. Under the Neutrality Treaty, Panama became obliged to guarantee the neutrality of the Canal Zone. In exchange, under the Panama Canal Treaty, the US promised to withdraw from the Canal Zone by the end of 1999 and guaranteed that Panama would assume full sovereignty over the area in 2000.

Hutchison Whampoa’s Control over the Panama Canal and Panama Law No.5
However, in 1996, Panama decided to auction the rights to manage the canal to a private company. Despite the fact that the Chinese company’s bid came in fourth after the Japanese firm, Kawasaki/I.T.S., the U.S. firm, Bechtel, and the Panamanian American company, M.I.T,[i] Panama awarded the contract to China’s Hutchinson Whampoa. A published report claimed that “Panama preemptively closed the bidding, secretly changed the rules,” and “simply awarded the contract to Hutchison Whampoa.”[ii] According to Constantine Menges, who headed the Latin American desk at the NSC during the Reagan Administration, “China was determined to win the bidding process and used corrupt means to influence the government of Panama in its favor.”[iii] In fact, a 1996 cable to the U.S. Embassy in Panama reported that just before the bidding, Beijing gave $400 million to Hutchison Whampoa through a state-run investment company, China Resources Enterprise,[iv] a company which was identified by Senator Fred Thompson as “an agent of espionage—economic, military, and political—for China” and “has reportedly served as an intelligence-collection front for China.”[v] William J. Hughes, the U.S. ambassador to Panama, and Senator Trent Lott objected to the ‘unorthodox’ bidding process and called for an investigation, but in vain. (See “The Americas Report” April 10, 2008. Article by Nicole M. Ferrand.)

Thus in January of 1997, through a state-contract called “Panama Law No.5,”[vi] Panama officially granted the right to control the canal[vii] to Hutchison Whampoa. Panama Law No. 5 also promised that at the end of the Panama Canal Treaty, “the areas, facilities, and installations” occupied by the Panama Canal Commission and the United States shall be turned over to Hutchison Whampoa (Clause 2.23.g). In other words, Hutchison Whampoa controls not only the ports at both ends of the canal, but also the surrounding areas the United States used to control, including the former U.S. Rodman Naval Station (Clause 2.1) and the former U.S. Albrook Air Force Base.[viii] The length of the lease to Hutchinson Whampoa is 25 years with an automatic renewal for another 25 years (Clause 2.9).

According to Panama Law No.5, Panama gave extensive and exclusive rights to Hutchison Whampoa. The document says, “During the life of this contract and its extension, THE COMPANY shall have the exclusive right to develop, construct, operate, administer and manage THE Ports”[ix] (Emphasis added). Hutchison Whampoa’s rights include: a right to “fence in, at any time, and entirely at its discretion, the area referred to here in as the Bonded Area[x] (Clause 2.1)”; a right to “subcontract all of its rights and activities granted by this concession contract, without the need for approval by THE STATE”; and a right to “carry out operations, transactions, negotiations, and activities in general, be they local or international, with any person or public, private or mixed entity.” That is, taking such extensive rights into accounts, it seems possible for Hutchison Whampoa to host and hide Chinese spying activities in the Canal Zone.

Hutchison Whampoa and Owner Li Ka-Shing’s Connections with Beijing
The owner of Hutchison Whampoa, Li Ka-Shing, has extensive ties with Beijing. In fact, a government document explicitly mentioned that Li “has significant economic and political ties to China.”[xi] For instance, Li and a son of the former Chinese President Jiang Zemin are jointly developing real estate properties inside Tiananmen Square for the communist party.[xii] In addition, in 1994, the Clinton administration provided Li’s bio, along with the bios of the top communist leaders, to the CEO of Loral Aerospace prior to the Ron Brown trade trip to Beijing;[xiii] Li was the only civilian included in the bios.[xiv] Li has also helped the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) purchase satellites in the past and mediated several satellite deals between the U.S. Hughes Corporation and China Hong Kong Satellite (ChinaSat),[xv]a company owned by the Chinese Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.[xvi] One U.S. government document stated that Li Ka-Shing “is willing to use his business influence to further the aims of the Chinese government.”[xvii]

A report by the RAND Corporation in 1997 pointed out that Li Ka-Shing was negotiating for PLA wireless system contracts.[xviii] Li was also a member of the board of directors of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), [xix] a bank of the Chinese army that provides money for Chinese weapon sales and Western technology purchases.[xx] Indeed, William Triplett, co-author of Red Dragon Rising, described Li as “the Banker for the Chinese Military.”[xxi] The fact that Hutchison has exclusive contracts with the state-owned China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) also suggests that Li Ka-Shing has a close relationship with Beijing.[xxii] COSCO is known for its failed attempts to acquire the former Long Beach Naval station in California.[xxiii] Furthermore, according to a RAND report, a COSCO ship attempted to smuggle over 2,000 fully automatic machine guns into the United States in 1996.[xxiv]

In 1991, Li Ka-Shing also attempted to gain control over Subic Bay, a strategic port in the Philippines that had been vacated by the United States. Due to warnings from U.S. Marine Corps personnel, Philippine President Ramos vetoed Hutchinson's take over of Subic Bay and Li Ka-Shing was unable to obtain the port.[xxv]

In 2003, Li attempted to take over the largest U.S. telecommunications company, Global Crossing Ltd. According to the New York Times,[xxvi] Global Crossing once agreed to make a deal with Hutchison Whampoa. However, Hutchison Whampoa decided to withdraw from the bid a few days after a review committee of foreign investment in U.S. companies announced that it had begun an investigation of the deal. Because a Chinese company with strong connections with Beijing was about to buy communication networks used by the federal government and other critical private sectors, members of congress and some governmental officials had raised national security concerns. Global Crossing provides services to the federal government, more than 35 percent of Fortune 500 companies, 700 carriers, mobile companies, and internet service providers.[xxvii] Global Crossing controls 20 percent of all the fiber-optic cable in the United States and is a major bidder for U.S. Defense communications contracts.[xxviii] Given Li Ka-Shing’s close ties with Beijing, as well as his attempts to control important U.S. infrastructure and a strategically important port in the Philippines it should make those responsible for U.S. national security question the national security implications of Hutchison Whampoa’s control over the Panama Canal.

In addition, Beijing seems to treat Li Ka-Shing in a special manner. For example, Beijing has given Li exclusive rights of first refusal over all mainland Chinese ports south of the Yangtze River. “This involves a close working relationship with the Chinese military and businesses controlled by the People’s Liberation Army,” said Al Santoli, a former national security advisor to the House of Representatives.[xxix] Further, Li’s bio provided by the Clinton Administration mentioned that Li was convicted of insider trading in 1984 but never punished.[xxx]

National Security Implications of Chinese Control of the Panama Canal
Now that Hutchison Whampoa controls both ends of the Panama Canal there are three major national security concerns that come to mind. These include; possible covert Chinese spying activities, strategic denial in the case of a serious conflict between China and the U.S., and strengthened Chinese political power that could threaten U.S. national interests. First, since Hutchison Whampoa has exclusive rights over the canal areas as Panama Law No.5 guarantees, the Chinese company could easily provide cover for Chinese espionage. This concern becomes more realistic when one considers China’s recent spying activities[i] and Li’s special relationships with Beijing and the PLA.

Secondly, in the event of a serious military conflict with the United States, such as one over Taiwan, it would be highly possible for Beijing to use Hutchison Whampoa to effectively interrupt U.S. intervention. As former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger puts it, Hutchison Whampoa’s control of the canal is a national security threat because “The Company would not be able to survive if they don’t do something the Chinese government tells them to.”[ii] Admiral Moore, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claims that in case of military conflict in the Pacific, a large number of logistic ships need uninterrupted access to the canal to support deployed forces.[iii] If the use of the canal were denied, those ships would need to travel an extra 9,000 miles around South America and would not be able to sustain combat effectiveness in the Pacific.[iv] “It is not ‘managing traffic’ under normal circumstances with which I am concerned,” said Moore, “it is the ability of a potential enemy to disrupt traffic so as to block military supply, which in times of conflict is 80 to 90 percent dependent upon sea lift capability for there to be any sustained forward effort.”[v] It is also important to remember that Chinese denial of the use of the canal would significantly damage the U.S. economy; the United States is the largest user of the canal and 15-20 percent of total U.S. trade, including 40 percent of grain exports and 670,000 barrels of oil per day, come through the canal. [vi]

Chinese Control of the Panama Canal as Part of a Larger Global Strategy
Third and most importantly, Chinese control of the canal is only part of a larger Beijing strategy to strengthen its geo-strategic positioning around the globe. The Center for Security Policy reported in 2002 that China is working hard to acquire strategic “choke points” around the world, including the Caribbean’s Bahamas, Subic Bay in the Philippines, the Mediterranean’s Malt, the Persian Gulf’s Straits of Hormuz, the Panama Canal[vii], and even cyberspace,[viii] outer space, and U.S. telecommunications.[ix] In addition, on April 20, 2008, “The Americas Report” stated that Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Port Holdings (HPH) had expressed interest in the Manta Port in Ecuador. In October, 2006 HPH gave a 1 million dollar bond to the Manta Port Authority and in November, 2006, HPH was the only final bidder and the Manta Port Authority (MPA) gave HPH operating concessions in exchange for $486 million (added to $55 million promised by the MPA) to upgrade facilities over the next 30 years. Hutchinson Port Holdings is the port-operating subsidiary of Hong Kong’s Hutchison-Whampoa which in 2001 bought out Philippines-based port operator ICTSI, which had various Latin American interests in Argentina, Mexico and the Bahamas. Manta is a desirable port for HPH as it is the closest port to Asia on Latin America’s west coast. Also, Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. has a significant presence at the Lazaro Cardenas seaport in Mexico, as well as other Mexican ports. China has been very effective in securing strategic locations which they clearly understand will give them the upper hand in the event of any future confrontation with the U.S.

Therefore, strengthened Chinese strategic positioning has U.S. national security implications, as conflicts with China are foreseeable. The Congressional Research Service has reported that China has three main long-term goals which include “asserting China’s regional military leadership while displacing U.S. regional military influence, prevailing in regional rivalries, and encouraging eventual U.S. military withdrawal from the region [Western Pacific].”[x] These goals are clearly incompatible with U.S. national security interests.[xi] The Taiwan situation and competition over natural resources could also lead to conflicts in the future.

To conclude our loss of the Panama Canal was a major strategic blunder by the Carter Administration that was followed up in 1997 by the Clinton Administration’s failure to assure that the bidding process was open and fair. Since China, through Hutchison Whampoa, now has almost total sovereignty over the Canal, the Neutrality Treaty agreed to by President Carter has little significance in terms of protecting future U.S. interests. In the event of a future conflict between China and the U.S., it will be China not Panama that will be calling the shots. (Please find footnotes at the end of the Report).

* Yojiro Konno is a senior sociology major at Grinnell College, IA. He is interested in public policy and is currently an intern at the Center for Security Policy.

*Nancy Menges is co-founder of the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center and Editor-in-Chief of the Americas Report.

[i] Demetri Sevastopulo. Feb. 11, 2008. “Four arrested in US-China spy cases.” Financial Times. (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c0a576d0-d8cd-11dc-8b22-0000779fd2ac.html)
[ii] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 397
[iii] Ed Oliver and Joseph Farah. November 9, 1998. “The Panama Canal debate rages: Admiral, ambassador square off in Senate testimony.” WorldNetDaily. (http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=16790)
[iv] Ed Oliver. October 18, 1998. “Admiral: I see big trouble in Panama.” WorldNetDaily. (http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=16751)
[v] Ed Oliver and Joseph Farah. November 9, 1998. “The Panama Canal debate rages: Admiral, ambassador square off in Senate testimony.” WorldNetDaily. (http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=16790)
[vi] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 396
[vii]The Center for Security Policy, cited in Slate Magazine Online. July 9, 2008. (http://fray.slate.com/discuss/forums/post/1357239.aspx)
[viii] “China’s Cyber-Militia” May 31, 2008. National Journal (http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/print_friendly.php?ID=cs_20080531_6948)
[ix] Glater, Jonathon D. May 1, 2003. “TECHNOLOGY; Hong Kong Partner Quits Joint Bid for Global Crossing.” New York Times.
[x] Ronald O’Rourke Page 44. “CRS Report for Congress: China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service.
[xi] Dr. Richard Weixing Hu, a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution, too, mentions that China wants the U.S. withdraw from East Asia at the event “Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy in East Asia” on June 3, 2008 (http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0603_cnaps.aspx)

[i] EagleForum.org. 1999. “Red China: Gatekeeper of the Panama Canal.” (http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/1999/nov99/psrnov99.html)
[ii] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 397.
[iii] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 397.
[iv] Smith, Charles R. February 12, 2002. “Chinese Billionaire Wants Global Crossing.” NewsMax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/2/11/184102.shtml)
[v]Smith, Charles R. August 6, 2002. “Li Ka-Shing Seeks U.S. Contract.” NewsMax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/8/5/181935.shtml)
[vi] Actual Texts from American Defense Center (http://www.americandefensecenter.org/documents.aspx) and ConservativeUSA (http://www.conservativeusa.org/panamalaw5.htm)
[vii] The document calls the two ports (Balboa and Cristobal) and surrounding areas combined as “The Existing Ports”
[viii] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 397.
[ix] “The Ports” in the document includes lands, facilities, and installations of “The Existing Ports” as well as “The Future Extension.”
[x] “The Bonded Area”: combined areas of “The Existing Ports” and “The Future Extension”
[xi] SoftWar. June 24, 2008. “Li Ka-Shing.” (http://www.softwar.net/kashing.html)
[xii] Smith, Charles R. August 6. 2002. “Li Ka-Shing Seeks U.S. Contract.” NewsMax (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/8/5/181935.shtml)
[xiii] SoftWar. June 24, 2008. “Li Ka-Shing.” (http://www.softwar.net/kashing.html)
[xiv] Smith, Charles R. August 6. 2002. “Li Ka-Shing Seeks U.S. Contract.” NewsMax.
[xv] Smith, Charles R. August 6. 2002. “Li Ka-Shing Seeks U.S. Contract.” NewsMax
[xvi] Federation of American Scientists. June 20, 1998. “Zhongxing / Chinasat.” (http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/comm/chinasat.htm)
[xvii] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 397.
[xviii]SoftWar. July 9, 2008. “Rand Corporation Report Chinese Military Commerce and U.S. National Security.” (http://www.softwar.net/rand.html)
Smith, Charles R. February 12, 2002. “Chinese Billionaire Wants Global Crossing.” Newsmax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/2/11/184102.shtml)
[xix] SoftWar. June 24, 2008. (http://www.softwar.net/kashing.html)
[xx] Smith, Charles R. February 27, 2003. “Global Double Crossing.” NewsMax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/2/26/182009.shtml)
[xxi] Smith, Charles. December 8, 1999. “‘Dirty’ War in Panama.” (http://ads.wnd.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=17277)
[xxii] Smith, Charles R. March 6, 2003. “Billionaire Fails in Bid for Global Crossing.” NewMax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/3/5/162452.shtml)
[xxiii] Smith, Charles R. March 6, 2003. “Billionaire Fails in Bid for Global Crossing” NewsMax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/3/5/162452.shtml)
[xxiv] SoftWar. July 9, 2008. “Rand Corporation Report Chinese Military Commerce and U.S. National Security.” (http://www.softwar.net/rand.html)
Smith, Charles. May 25, 1999. “Chinagate's smoking gun.” WorldNetDaily. (http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/access/29879182.html?dids=29879182:29879182&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Jun+02%2C+1998&author=PAUL+RICHTER&pub=Los+Angeles+Times&desc=Long+Beach+Deal+Put+in+Jeopardy+by+China+Fears&pqatl=google)
[xxv] Smith, Charles. May 25, 1998. “The Panama-China connection: Port company at canal has close ties to Lippo group” The World Net Daily. (http://www.worldnetdaily.com/index.php?pageId=3251)
[xxvi] Glater, Jonathon D. May 1, 2003. “TECHNOLOGY; Hong Kong Partner Quits Joint Bid for Global Crossing.” New York Times. (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05E2DD1F3DF932A35756C0A9659C8B63 )
[xxvii] Global Crossing Official Website. July 8, 2008. “About us” (http://www.globalcrossing.com/company/company_landing.aspx)
[xxviii] Smith, Charles R. February 12, 2002. “Chinese Billionaire Wants Global Crossing.” NewsMax. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/2/11/184102.shtml)
[xxix] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current. Page 397
[xxx] SoftWar. “Li Ka-Shing.” (http://www.softwar.net/kashing.html)

[i] Edward Cody. July 9, 2007. “China's Diplomatic Gain Is Taiwan's Loss” Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/08/AR2007070801065_pf.html)
[ii] BBC News. December 7, 2007. “Panama schools to teach Chinese.” BBC. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/mobile/bbc_news/world/americas/713/71312/story7131205.shtml?page_id=16)
[iii] Panama Ports Company Official Website (http://www.ppc.com.pa/index_eng.php)
[iv] Official website of Hutchison Whampoa clearly mentions that Panama Ports Company is a subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa (http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/eng/ports/international/the_americas.htm)

[i] Edward Cody. July 9, 2007. “China's Diplomatic Gain Is Taiwan's Loss” Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/08/AR2007070801065_pf.html)
[ii] BBC News. December 7, 2007. “Panama schools to teach Chinese.” BBC. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/mobile/bbc_news/world/americas/713/71312/story7131205.shtml?page_id=16)

[i] House Committee of Foreign Affairs. June 11, 2008. “New Challenge: China in the Western Hemisphere.” (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1004)

Venezuela’s Tarek El - Aissami

Venezuela’s Tarek El - Aissami
By Nicole M. Ferrand*

Since our inception two years ago, we have been following the growing relationship between Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Although most of the information available in the media states that this relationship started in 2005, it actually began as soon as Chavez started his mandate in 1999. In fact, on November 19, 2007, the Iranian reformist newspaper, E’temad-e-Melli, published an article claiming that relations between Tehran and Caracas began with the formation of the (Iranian) Reformist government when former President Muhammed Khatami visited Venezuela during his time in office. They became so close that in 2005 Chavez presented the Iranian leader with the highest decoration, the Order of the Liberator, as a symbol of their strong ties.[1]

The Venezuelan President then encouraged Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega to develop ties with Iranian President Ahmadinejad which they did. All four of these countries now have strong ties to Iran and have signed treaties in diverse areas of the economy. In exchange, Iran has received many benefits including a strong presence in the Hemisphere as well as support from Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador against UN sanctions. Although insiders claim that Iran had no interest in developing relationships with Caracas, per se, Khatami’s regime was under international pressure to make new alliances among non-aligned countries. In the Middle East, Tehran had strong ties with Syria and Qatar, but it did not have any base from where they could actually threaten the United States and that is when Caracas became of interest.[2] After learning of Chavez’s leadership in the Hemisphere, Tehran planned a strategy to establish itself in nations under the Venezuelan leader’s influence.

Manuchehr Honarmand was a witness to the developing Iranian-Venezuelan relationship. Mr. Honarmand is a Dutch citizen who used to write columns for the opposition daily Kayhan International, based in London. An Iranian dissident journalist, Honarmand decided to go to the US to expand the newspaper’s distribution. In December 2002 he visited South America for tourism and while in transit at the Caracas airport, waiting for a connecting flight, he was approached by two Iranians who asked him to provide information about himself. They were soon joined by two Venezuelan policemen.[3]

After learning who he was, they handcuffed him and brought him to an office behind the transit area where he was beaten and forced to sign papers in Spanish, which he did not understand. A few hours later, Honarmand was thrown into a cell where he was told that he had been charged with drug trafficking.

Furthermore, he was refused contact with the Dutch Embassy. A Venezuelan National Guard report stated that his “drug - filled suitcase” was found in a Copa Airlines flight even though Honarmand had been traveling on KLM.[4]

Mr. Honarmand’s luggage, money and papers were stolen and his Dutch passport was confiscated by the Venezuelan police. While he was in jail, he was able to contact Houshang Vaziri, his editor in chief, who promised to help but soon disappeared and was later found dead in Paris. Honarmand was freed in 2005, thanks to the Dutch government’s pressures. During his time in Caracas he spoke with discontented insiders of Chavez’s regime who informed him about the presence of Iranian officials in every sector of the economy and that they occupied high positions in the National Guard and the police. They also told Honarmand that Iranian officials are actually proselytizing in the poorest sectors of Venezuelan society to attract followers.[5] However, what has many insiders worried is the possibility of radicals holding government positions. The recent designation of Tarek El – Aissami as Minster of Interior and Justice of Venezuela has raised concerns because of his connections with extremist groups.

Mr. El – Aissami is a Venezuelan national of Syrian descent who, before becoming Minster of Interior and Justice, occupied the position of Deputy Interior Minister for Public Security. His father, Carlos Aissami, is the head of the Venezuelan branch of the Iraqi Baath political party. Before the invasion of Iraq, he held a press conference in which he described himself as a Taliban and called Osama Bin Laden, “the great Mujahedeen, Sheik Osama bin Laden.” Tarek’s great-uncle Shibli el-Aissami was a prominent ideologist and assistant to the party’s secretary general in Baghdad during the Saddam Hussein regime.[1]

It was discovered that in 2003 El Aissami was appointed, along with another radical student leader from the University of the Andes in the city of Mérida, Hugo Cabezas, to head the country’s passport and naturalization service, the Onidex (Identification and Immigration Office). The choice came as a surprise precisely because of their ties with guerrilla movements at Universidad de Los Andes (ULA). Evidence has surfaced that during this time both men illegally issued Venezuelan passports and identity documents to members of Hezbollah and Hamas. Mr. Cabezas is now the government candidate for governor of the Andean state of Trujillo in elections due to be held on November 23, 2008 and is a founding member of Utopia, an armed group that has connections with the Bolivarian Liberation Front.[2]

While a student leader at ULA, Aissami had political control of the university residences (dorms), which were used to hide stolen vehicles and conduct drug deals and had managed to get members of the guerillas into the dorms. According to reports, of the 1,122 people living in one of the University’s residences, only 387 were active students and more than 600 had nothing to do with the university.[3]

Venezuelan investigative journalist, Patricia Poleo, who escaped Venezuela and currently lives in Miami says that Mr. Aissami together with others affiliated with Hezbollah, such as Lebanon-born Gahzi Nasserddine, currently the Business Liaison at the Venezuelan embassy in Damascus, and his brother, Ghasan Atef Salameh Nasserddi, are in charge of recruiting young Venezuelan Arabs affiliated with the ‘Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela’ or PSUV (Chavez’s Socialist Party), to be sent to South Lebanon for combat training in Hezbollah camps preparing them for ‘asymmetrical war’ against the United States. Once back in Venezuela, they are greeted by radical members of the Venezuelan Socialist Party affiliated with UNEFA (the university run by the Armed Forces) and the Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela (Venezuelan Bolivarian University) and continue with their training in firearms, explosives and munitions. The training camps are located in the states of Monagas, Miranda, el Páramo, Falcon, Yaracuy, Yumare, and Trujillo and the districts of Maturin, Los Teques, El Jari, Churuguara and Sierra de San Luis. These groups and individuals are supervised by the Hezbollah Organization in Venezuela, along with al-Qaeda Iraqis currently living in the country and by the Palestinian Democratic Front, headed by Salid Ahmed Rahman, whose office is located in Caracas’s Central Park.[4]

Since Chavez assumed the Presidency, Hezbollah, Hamas and al-Qaeda have used Venezuela as their bridge to other Latin American countries. There is information that a group of Iraqi activists belonging to al-Qaeda are currently in Caracas. Their names are: Mohammed Adnan Yasin, Falah Amin Taha and Muhi Alwan Mohammed Al Qaisi. They all arrived in Caracas with temporary visas granted and approved by the heads of Onidex (Cabezas and Aissami) and are believed to be very dangerous. They oversee the activities of these terrorist organizations in the tri – border region, and in Nicaragua and Argentina.[5]

Other Hezbollah members in Venezuela with these same visas are: explosives expert Lebanese Abdul Ghani Suleiman Wanked, Hassan Nasrallah’s right-hand man.; Rada Ramel Assad, born in Barranquilla, Colombia and Abouchanab Daichoum Dani who is the organizer of the group.[6]
We have to be very careful about what is going on in Venezuela. Independent media outlets have warned that the Chávez regime was issuing ID documents to Islamic radicals, enabling them to operate and move freely to other countries. It is extremely worrisome and dangerous to appoint a radical such as Aissami as the official in charge of issuing identity cards and passports but this serves the goals of the Iranian and Venezuelan presidents in their joint efforts to radicalize the region and build terrorist networks.

Other articles written by the staff of The America’s Report that can be referenced to in relation with this story are: “The Iranian threat already in the US’ backyard”, February 14, 2008 by Nicole M. Ferrand; “Latin America’s radical grassroots”, by Luis Fleischman and Nicole M. Ferrand from March 27, 2007; “The Radical Grassroots in Latin America II”, by Luis Fleischman and Nicole M. Ferrand from April 11, 2007; “The Latin American Radical Grassroots III”, by Luis Fleischman and Nicole M. Ferrand).

*Nicole M. Ferrand is the editor of “The Americas Report” of the Menges Hemispheric Security Project. She is a graduate of Columbia University in Economics and Political Science with a background in Law from Peruvian University, UNIFE and in Corporate Finance from Georgetown University.

[1] Al Arabiya – Ibid.
[2] Jihad in Venezuela. November 29, 2003. Jihad Watch.
[3] Memri – Ibid.
[4] Hezbollah and Al Qaeda in Venezuela. June 12, 2008 The Jungle Hut.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid,

[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.
[3] The Iran-Venezuela Connection. February 14, 2008. Memri.
[4] Ibid.

[1] Unholy alliance between Caracas and Tehran. January 13, 2008. Al Arabiya News.

China’s Cuban/Venezuelan Connection.

China’s Cuban/Venezuelan Connection.
By Yojiro Konno.*

Since the People’s Republic of China took over control of the Panama Canal in 2000, China has been rapidly increasing its activities in Latin America. In terms of economic activities, trade between China and Latin America increased 10 times in less than 10 years. President Hu Jintao’s visits to several Latin American countries in 2004 and his promise to invest $100 billion in the region also illustrate China’s increased presence in Latin America.

Although China is establishing closer ties with numerous countries in Latin America, its close relations with Cuba and Venezuela deserve special attention. Some analysts assume that China’s ties with Cuba and Venezuela are primarily economic and are compatible with U.S. interests. Considering, however, China’s alleged weapons sales to Cuba and Venezuela, Chinese electronic spying facilities in Cuba, and Chinese opposition to U.S.-led efforts regarding these two anti-American regimes, it is reasonable to conclude that such Chinese advancement does hurt U.S. security interests.

Brief Overview: China’s Connections with Cuba and Venezuela
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of economic, political, and military support from the Soviet Union, it was China who rescued Cuba from their severe economic crisis. China had provided interest-free loans to Cuba in the early 1990s, and in 2001 China signed an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement, under which China offered substantial support to Cuba, including an additional $6.5 million interest-free loan and a $200 million grant to modernize Cuba’s telecommunications. Furthermore, China and Cuba started 10 operative joint ventures with a particular focus on pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.[i]

In 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a trade agreement which called for $500- million-Chinese-investment in Cuban nickel plants and an annual 4,400 tons of Cuban nickel exports to China. China also agreed to provide a $6 million grant to Cuban hospitals, materials for school uniforms valued at $6 million, and one-million television sets. Trade between the two countries reached $2.2 billion in 2007, almost a 250 percent increase from 2005.[ii] In the last few years, China became Cuba’s second-largest trading partner, next to Venezuela.[iii] The frequent high-class military exchanges and the expansion of weapons systems provided by China to Cuba show the close military ties that now exist between the two countries.[iv]

In terms of Chinese-Venezuelan relations, Hugo Chavez’s visit to China in 1999 illustrated the strong ties between the two countries. During his trip, Chavez signed a number of oil and political agreements, including Venezuela’s purchase of Chinese military equipment and China’s dispatch of military trainers to Venezuela.[v] Indeed, after the failed attempt to overthrow Hugo Chavez in 2002, PLA military trainers replaced U.S. military trainers in Venezuela.[vi]

China’s Weapon Sales to Cuba and Venezuela
In June 2001, citing U.S. intelligence sources, the Washington Times reported that state-run China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) sent “at least three shipments of weapons” to Cuba during 2000.[vii] A Chinese spokesman, Zhang Yuanyuan, denied the allegations saying, “China has supplied the Cuban military with logistics items - never arms,” although he refused to specify what kinds of “logistics items” China provides.[viii] Being asked if explosives were included, the Chinese spokesman simply said that explosives could be used for both civilian and military purposes.[ix] Some claim that such military logistic items are used to modernize the base and other military equipment, including Russian war planes.

An intelligence source told the daily El Nuevo Herald, a Spanish newspaper published in Miami, that China limits its military assistance to logistical items, such as radars and aircraft equipment.[x] Additionally, because the U.S. State Department denied that the government had documents “confirming” China’s allegations, it seems that Chinese military sales to Cuba are in fact limited to “logistical items.” Jason Feer from CubaNews claims that China is unlikely to supply lethal weapons to Cuba because such an act triggers a 1996 U.S. law that requires U.S. economic sanctions against a country that provides significant arms to Cuba.[xi] However, now that China controls the Panama Canal, where most ships from the Pacific pass through in order to reach Cuba, such speculation causes one to wonder how the United States detects China’s weapon sales to Cuba without any U.S. presence at the Panama Canal.[xii]

China is getting closer to selling significant weapons to another anti-U.S. regime in Latin America—Venezuela. The United States used to be a principal military supporter of Venezuela until Hugo Chavez took over the government. However, now that Chavez is President of Venezuela, Venezuela recently purchased a modern communications satellite and three Chinese long-range defense radars in an attempt to reduce its dependency on the United States. The contract includes China’s right to have leased access to a satellite communications network. According to the Press Association, this satellite is to be launched on November 1, 2008.[xiii] Al Santoli, a former Senior Vice-President of the American Foreign Policy Council, testified to Congress that one intelligence source reported that China recently offered to sell FC-1 fighters to Venezuela.[xiv] Richard Fisher, a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, even claims: “We can anticipate that Chavez will soon be buying Chinese weapons.”[xv] Indeed, a news article of the Press Association on August 18, 2008, reported that President Chavez said that Venezuela is looking to purchase Chinese-made military planes.[xvi]

China’s Electronic Espionage Facilities in Cuba and Intelligence Sharing
China operates several electronic and cyber-warfare bases in Cuba, which, according to Al Santoli, “not only permit enhanced electronic surveillance of broad areas of the U.S. at present,” but also “can be used to disrupt critical U.S. strategic communications during a period of conflict.”[xvii] China seems to operate at least three electronic and cyber spying facilities in Cuba: one in Santiago de Cuba, another in Bejucal, and the third in Lourdes.

A spying facility in Santiago de Cuba, located in the far east of Cuba, seems to be intercepting U.S. satellite signals, including military satellite communications, according to Cuban sources in 1999.[xviii][xix][xx] An espionage base in the Bejucal area is said to possess complex telephone interception systems.[xxi][xxii][xxiii] In Lourdes near Havana, China reportedly operates an electronic espionage facility after Russia abandoned its largest espionage facility outside the former Soviet Union in 2001.[xxiv] Al Santoli claims that these bases have been camouflaged under a pretext of China-Cuba collaboration regarding telecommunications.[xxv]

In 2005 China was accused of conducting espionage activities using front companies to steal sensitive military technologies from the United States, Britain, Germany, and Canada.[xxvi] Considering China’s past attempts some are rightly concerned that while China’s close military ties does not provide an immediate military threat to the United States, it enhances China’s asymmetrical military options because China was able to obtain “major listening posts and communications jamming stations in Cuba.”[xxvii]

Additionally, as Chavez has suggested that he may provide China and Cuba with some U.S. military jets so they can study the technology,[xxviii] it is possible for these three countries to cooperate in espionage against the United States and share intelligence with their anti-U.S. friends, such as Iran and other state sponsors of terrorism (See The Americas Report on July 24, 2008, article by David Witter).

China as a Guardian of State-Sponsor of Terror and Anti-U.S. Regime
China has been a powerful advocate of Cuba, a state sponsor of terror as designated by the U.S. State Department. Chinese President Jiang in 2001 claimed that China “supports the Cuban people’s fight to safeguard state sovereignty…and reject foreign intervention and threats…. Politically we support and understand each other.”[xxix] Indeed, China consistently opposes U.S. sanctions on Cuba at the United Nations.

For example, China’s UN representative criticized the United States for maintaining the embargo on Cuba in October 2004 and opposed U.S.-led efforts to condemn Cuba for its repression of civil and political freedom in April 2005. It is also important to remember that China has veto rights on the U.N. Security Council that could be used against any decision seeming to harm China’s friends, such as Venezuela, Cuba, Sudan, Iran, North Korea and others.

Castro and Chavez seem to know from prior experience that the United States will not take any strong actions against them if China is on their side. Now two anti-U.S. regimes in Latin America seemed to have gained a powerful ally that supports their undemocratic regimes.[xxx]

China Threat: Strategic Positioning around Latin America and the World
Not only has China obtained energy and natural resources from Cuba and Venezuela, but it has also succeeded in gaining anti-U.S. friends with strategic locations, creating a counterweight to the United States in Latin America. Considering Chinese control of the Panama Canal, other Chinese attempts to secure strategic locations around the world, Chinese rapid naval modernization beyond capabilities necessary at the Taiwan Strait, and its support to anti-U.S. regimes, policy makers in the government and on Capitol Hill should be able to connect the dots and realize what such moves by the Chinese really mean and how the United States should respond.

It seems clear that the Chinese government is interfering with U.S. efforts to contain openly hostile regimes in its hemisphere; a policy that should be considered in the overall U.S.-China relationship. Finally, Evan Ellis, a Latin American analyst at Booz Allen Hamilton, provides a great hint regarding what these Chinese moves may mean: “Chinese strategic thinking, from the writings of Sun Tzu to classic games such as ‘go’ emphasize the value of setting the stage, as much as the battle itself. The idea is to position oneself at an advantage in all possible realms –politically, militarily or physically—so that if a tangible confrontation must occur, the adversary simply cannot prevail.”[xxxi]

* Yojiro Konno is a senior sociology major at Grinnell College, IA. He is interested in public policy and is currently an intern at the Center for Security Policy.
[i] “Cuba and China: the new face of an old relationship.” AllBusiness. September 22, 2006. (http://www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/national-security-international/3975916-1.html)
[ii] “Cuba–China Ties in Focus as Standing Committee Member Visits Fidel.” Transpacifica. June 27, 2008.
(http://transpacifica.net/2008/06/27/cuba%E2%80%93china-ties-in-focus-as-standing-committee-member-visits-fidel/)
[iii] “Chinese presence, interests in Cuba growing.” The Miami Herald. June 24, 2007. (http://www.hemisferio.org/al-eeuu/boletines/02/75/pol_20.pdf)
[iv] “China and Cuba: Dangerous Liaison.” NewsMax. June 29, 2001. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/6/28/211846.shtml)
[v] Testimony of Albert Santoli. July 21, 2005. “China’s Strategic Reach into Latin America.” (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/santoli_albert_wrts.htm)
[vi] Testimony of Albert Santoli. July 21, 2005. “China’s Strategic Reach into Latin America.” (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/santoli_albert_wrts.htm)
[vii] “China and Cuba: Dangerous Liaison.” NewsMax. June 29, 2001. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/6/28/211846.shtml)
[viii] The Washington Times. 2001. “China claims sale of 'logistics items,' not arms.” (http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y01/jun01/14e4.htm)
[ix] The Washington Times. 2001. “China claims sale of 'logistics items,' not arms.” (http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y01/jun01/14e4.htm)
[x] Asia Times. 2001. “China/Cuba/US Taiwan tit-for-tat.” (http://www.atimes.com/china/CF22Ad04.html)
[xi] Asia Times. 2001. “China/Cuba/US Taiwan tit-for-tat.” (http://www.atimes.com/china/CF22Ad04.html)
[xii] The Washington Times. 2001. “China claims sale of 'logistics items,' not arms.” (http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y01/jun01/14e4.htm)
[xiii] “Venezuela to Launch Satellite.” August 18, 2008. The Press Association. (http://ukpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5jOiDMTD1_8Can9ZlVOBVbLstAd6Q)
[xiv] Testimony of Albert Santoli. July 21, 2005. “China’s Strategic Reach into Latin America.” (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/santoli_albert_wrts.htm)
[xv] Testimony of Albert Santoli. July 21, 2005. “China’s Strategic Reach into Latin America.” (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/santoli_albert_wrts.htm)
[xvi] “Venezuela to Launch Satellite.” August 18, 2008. The Press Association. (http://ukpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5jOiDMTD1_8Can9ZlVOBVbLstAd6Q)
[xvii] “China’s ‘Peaceful’ Invasion: Latin America attractive as market for arms sales.” Washington Times. November 20, 2005. (http://www.washtimes.com/news/2005/nov/20/20051120-124045-3471r/?page=3)
[xviii] Stephen Johnson. October 2005. “Balancing China’s Influence in Latin America.” Heritage Foundation. (http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/upload/84474_1.pdf)
[xix] Testimony of Albert Santoli. July 21, 2005. “China’s Strategic Reach into Latin America.” (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/santoli_albert_wrts.htm)
[xx] “Castro And Cuba Dance With China How Cuba-China Relations Will Affect The U.S.” 2002. NBC6. (http://www.nbc6.net/hanktester/1497131/detail.html)
[xxi] Stephen Johnson. October 2005. “Balancing China’s Influence in Latin America.” Heritage Foundation. (http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/upload/84474_1.pdf)
[xxii] Testimony of Albert Santoli. July 21, 2005. “China’s Strategic Reach into Latin America.” (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/santoli_albert_wrts.htm)
[xxiii] “Cuba and China: the new face of an old relationship.” AllBusiness. September 22, 2006. (http://www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/national-security-international/3975916-1.html)
[xxiv] Stephen Johnson. October 2005. “Balancing China’s Influence in Latin America.” Heritage Foundation. (http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/upload/84474_1.pdf)
[xxv] Testimony of Albert Santoli. July 21, 2005. “China’s Strategic Reach into Latin America.” (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/santoli_albert_wrts.htm)
[xxvi] Fred Stakelbeck. “Sino-Cuba energy relations raise concern in Washington” Aug, 2006. (http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/energywatch/oilandgas/features/article_1190927.php/Sino-Cuba_energy_relations_raise_concern_in_Washington?page=2)
[xxvii] Testimony of Albert Santoli. July 21, 2005. “China’s Strategic Reach into Latin America.” (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/santoli_albert_wrts.htm)
[xxviii] “China’s ‘Peaceful’ Invasion: Latin America attractive as market for arms sales.” Washington Times. November 20, 2005. (http://www.washtimes.com/news/2005/nov/20/20051120-124045-3471r/?page=3)
[xxix] Menges, Constantine C. 2005. China: the gathering threat. Nelson Current.
[xxx] “China and Cuba: Dangerous Liaison.” NewsMax. June 29, 2001. (http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/6/28/211846.shtml)
[xxxi] “China’s ‘Peaceful’ Invasion: Latin America attractive as market for arms sales.” Washington Times. November 20, 2005. (http://www.washtimes.com/news/2005/nov/20/20051120-124045-3471r/?page=3)

Thank you Mr. Uribe.

By Nicole M. Ferrand.*

Those of us who have been following the news about the hostages’ inferno at the hands of the narco-terrorist group known as the FARC are still amazed by the brilliant rescue of fifteen of them last week by the Colombian military, including eleven policemen and armed forces personnel and their most valuable captives: Ingrid Betancourt and the three American contractors. Although most world leaders are praising President Uribe and the Colombian armed forces for the stunning outcome, there are some who received the news as a blow. These include the Venezuelan, Bolivian, Ecuadorian, Nicaraguan and Argentinian Presidents, leftist Colombian Senator, Piedad Cordoba and others, including family members of one particular hostage who seem incapable or unwilling to thank or apologize to the people responsible for the release; I am talking about Mrs. Betancourt’s mother, Yolanda Pulecio, sister, Astrid Betancourt, and husband Juan Carlos Lecompte.

Although she is now free, I cannot forget the attitude of her family during the last few years she was held captive. Led by Chavez and Piedad Cordoba they all said that Mr. Uribe didn’t want to rescue Ingrid and that he was a warmonger who didn’t care about her. They accused the Colombian President of being the devil saying he would only provoke Ingrid’s death and that he should not attempt any military rescue. They actually said that Uribe would sabotage any attempt to free her because he feared she might run for President and ruin his chances. Then when Uribe ended Chavez’s role as a mediator because he was illegally contacting the armed forces of Colombia, Chavez and the above mentioned leaders and her family were up in arms saying that he had just sealed Ingrid’s fate and that she would be killed because the only one who could free her was Chavez.

Well, last Wednesday, Mr. Uribe, his minister of defense, Juan Manuel Santos and the brave military personnel achieved what the people mentioned above said was impossible: the successful rescue of these hostages. All the credit goes to Uribe for not caving into international pressure from people who wanted a negotiation to allow the FARC to become a political force in return for the liberation of the captives. Moreover, the best part is that not one shot was fired and nobody was injured or died. Therefore, none of the human rights NGO’s or groups can accuse operation “Checkmate” of abuses.

Immediately after being handed a microphone, Ingrid began to praise the Colombian President, the Defense Minister and the Armed Forces of her country, and you could see in her face and in the expression of the other hostages, complete gratitude and relief after years of living in nightmarish conditions in the dense Colombian jungle. She was generous in saying that it was great for Colombia that current President Alvaro Uribe was elected and then re-elected and that his second term was a great blow for the FARC. She described the operation as ‘impeccable and perfect,’ while her mother didn’t know where to look and seemed incredibly uncomfortable. But the rescue was also daring. If things would have gone wrong, just imagine the reactions against Uribe. However, the Colombian President not only acted with dignity but demonstrated that he is a great statesman and leader, while at the same time showing humility about his role in the rescue. He did just as he had done when he decided to get FARC leader, Reyes who was hiding in Ecuador under governmental protection: Uribe made a bold decision, planed the operation very well, and achieved a successful outcome.

Ingrid’s mother, Yolanda Pulecio, and her sister and husband became very close to the enemies of democracy and peace who in reality were using her suffering politically to achieve for the FARC the status of “belligerent forces” selling them the idea that this would mean the immediate release of her daughter. A lie, of course, but they decided to go along. Astutely, the Colombian government bitterly protested saying that the people who were lobbying for this outcome might take the further step of recognizing the FARC as a “state in formation,” a status that France and Mexico granted the Sandinista rebels during the Nicaraguan civil war in the late 1970s. “Such a move would mean giving the FARC diplomatic immunity, asylum rights, Venezuelan passports, and freedom from extradition, said former Colombian Defense Minister Rafael Pardo, now a consultant based in Bogota. “They would be giving the FARC legitimacy, and that’s very grave.”

So what did Mrs. Pulecio who believed her new found “friends” say about Uribe before her daughter’s liberation? The following words of hate: “I’ve only hated one person in my life: Presidente Alvaro Uribe Vélez.” “Uribe has only wanted to humiliate me, taking advantage of my pain as a mother.” “If my daughter is still not free, it’s Uribe’s fault.” “I’ve opposed Ingrid’s children living in Colombia, for fear that Uribe, his army, or his paramilitaries would harm them.” “I’ve never spoken badly of the FARC, because I understand their struggle.”

On April 12, in Caracas, Mrs. Pulecio said, verbatim, in the presence of President Chávez, and a gathering of almost a hundred people who attended the Meeting of Intellectuals and Artists in Defense of Humanity: “Señor Presidente, for me it’s a great honor that you should hear me here. I want to take advantage of this opportunity to thank you from the bottom of my heart for all that you’ve done for those who’ve been kidnapped and what you’ve done for my daughter. So I already don’t know what else to do. I feel confident in everything that you’ve done, and I feel much safer here than in Colombia. As you know, I’ve had to suffer all the lies, all the deception during these six years in which we’ve been permanently deceived, naturally I’ve had to suffer the fact that there is no true press. This morning when I heard that we need to recover truth in the media, that the media should tell the truth, and that all of us must be vigilant, this hit me in my soul. Because in Colombia all I read are lies, I read the papers and say: ‘This is false, this is false, this is false.’ Even the polls deceive the people. But, okay, I don’t want to get into political things but I do want, Presidente, to give you infinite thanks for what you’ve done and may do for my daughter and for all those who are kidnapped. To all of you I ask for your solidarity, this I wouldn’t wish on anyone, I’ve endured an ordeal, but my daughter has endured a worse ordeal, going on seven years now. I give great thanks for the help that you may give us, Mr. Chavez, for your support right now, for something that for me, is really, Presidente, as you know, very hard. Thank you very much.”

This February, at a massive world rally against the FARC where millions went to the streets wearing white shirts saying “No more FARC” and “No more kidnappings,” demonstrators flooded the streets of 125 capitals around the world. “I feel the pain of the families of the hostages rotting in the jungle ... and I want all the nations of the world to realize that the FARC is not Colombia,” one demonstrator said. Outrageously, Astrid Betancourt, Ingrid’s sister said: “We condemn this, it is propaganda, which while pretending to be against the FARC is completely organized by the government.” She also commented “all attempts at bringing the government and Farc together were always frustrated by Uribe,” adding “We must end this policy of confrontation with Farc and negotiate a humanitarian pact with them. Bush’s re-election has, unfortunately, had effects in Colombia since it has encouraged Uribe in his war mentality rejecting any dialogue with Farc who to him are ‘terrorists.’ This policy is not compatible with respect for human rights. But the president is standing firm on his position of confrontation with Farc. He could, however, show that his government is in a strong position, by showing that it is amenable to signing a humanitarian agreement with the guerrilla fighters. I am convinced that it is with such a pact and not through military confrontation, that the hostages’ lives can be saved. It is not just Ingrid’s life but that of the 3,000 hostages, that are at stake.”

Incredibly, adopting the vocabulary of a FARC defender Astrid continued “The issue of a hard line is placed in the international context of ‘combating terrorism.’ But FARC’s fight should not be compared with the terrorist attacks of New York or Madrid. There has been guerrilla warfare in Colombia for more than 40 years. I cannot say that my mother or I feel hatred towards Farc: Who are they? The leadership comprises a secretariat of about 15 people. But there are thousands of ordinary soldiers who got involved because they have no other chance of earning their living. We know families where a son is in Farc and another serves in the Colombian army. The brothers are trying to survive. The country can only be united again by dialogue, not by military confrontation.”

Months before “Checkmate,” Betancourt’s husband, Mr. Lecompte had accused the Colombian president of ordering the capture in Venezuela of a prominent member of the FARC after having learned that he was taking steps with Switzerland to have Ingrid liberated. Lecompte was referring to the case of Rodrigo Granda, arrested on 13 December in Caracas in an incident that caused a diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Venezuela that the two governments are currently trying to put behind them. He did not reveal the source of his information. Then in December after the FARC’s and Chavez’s blunder with the hostage liberation, Mr. Lecompte said: “We are going to insist that the government abstain from doing any military operations to rescue Ingrid,” as if Uribe had any fault in this. When Lecompte was told about the recent rescue, he quickly said “I am so emotional and so happy…I don’t have words” He forgot to thank the President, the minister of Defense and the brave commandos for the release for his wife.

The only words that Ingrid Betancourt had for the enemies of Colombia and friends of terror were: “Don’t meddle in Colombian democracy; respect our government” or in other words “Don’t continue helping the FARC.” Now the world will listen: Ingrid has conveyed to the whole world the horror of her captivity and how her captors required her to perform forced labor in order to get medicine.

Mrs. Pulecio, Astrid Betancourt, J.C. Lecompte and others who have accused, insulted and blamed everything on Uribe should understand that the Colombian President did not kidnap Ingrid; the FARC did. Uribe didn’t advise her to enter into FARC territory against the wishes of Colombian military personnel. In fact, while she was campaigning she met with the FARC leadership including Reyes and thought they respected her. She made a grave mistake and paid a very high price for trusting them. Uribe rescued not only her, but three Americans and eleven members of the police and the armed forces. He is the one to thank, not blame. For the sake of all those rescued, apologize and say a public and loud ‘Thank you’ to the ones responsible for the hostages’ new found freedom.

One more thing, let’s hope that Ingrid has learned her lesson and doesn’t forget who her real rescuers and friends are. She should stand by her government and the armed forces of her country: Colombia. She is now in Paris, praising Sarkozy, talking to Chavez over the phone, and is being treated like a queen. Perhaps this new found ‘celebrity status’ may be going to her head. She has said she may run for President and perhaps is now calculating her chances. Just yesterday, surprisingly, for the first time since her release she said: Colombian President Alvaro Uribe should soften his tone when dealing with the Marxist FARC, and urged him to break with the language of “hatred.” “President Uribe, and not just President Uribe but Colombia as a whole, should change some things,” Betancourt told RFI radio, making her first public criticism of her one-time political rival. “I think the time has come to change the language of radicalism, extremism and hatred, the very strong words that cause deep hurt to a human being,” she said, adding that tolerance and respect were needed. Let’s keep an eye on her.

*Nicole M. Ferrand is a research analyst and editor of “The Americas Report” of the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center for Security Policy in Washington DC. (www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org). She is a graduate of Columbia University in Economics and Political Science with a background in Law from Peruvian University, UNIFE and in Corporate Finance from Georgetown University.

Soccer and Politics in Argentina: Mauricio Macri.

By Nicole M. Ferrand.*

Our previous two articles on Argentina focused on the growing problems the country is now experiencing. This includes a high rate of inflation (23%), an ongoing farmers’ strike against an unfair government tax that has led to millions of dollars in losses, huge protests for and against the current regime which have sometimes turned violent and a general feeling of discontent amongst most Argentinians. In fact, there are voices that are convinced that Mrs. Fernandez’s regime won’t last and are talking about the formation of a coalition government and even the possibility of holding elections at an earlier date.

Although some say it might be too soon to be thinking about elections, many analysts are already considering possible candidates to replace Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Argentina is a country with such potential that it is a shame to witness how administration after administration has led the country to where it is now: chaos. Argentina needs a change of direction and many analysts are convinced and hope that the person capable of doing that is the current Head of the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Macri.

Who is Mauricio Macri?
Mr. Macri was born on February 8, 1959 in Tandil, in the province of Buenos Aires. He is a relatively new politician who studied at the Catholic University of Argentina (UCA), where he received a degree in Civil Engineering. He also attended Columbia Business School, Wharton Business School and Universidad del CEMA.[1] His professional career in business includes management positions in various successful companies since 1985 such as Sideco, SOCMA, and Sevel. These companies were part of a larger family business corporation managed by his father, Franco Macri.

Boca Juniors
If you have been to Argentina, you know by now that football or soccer (fútbol in every country except the USA) is more than a religion there. Argentinians are real fanatics of the sport and whenever the country’s team plays a game, Argentina literally stops functioning: everybody is in a stadium, glued to a TV, the phones stop ringing and businesses close. Don’t even bother calling for a taxi: they disappear from the streets. People, especially men, actually sob whether it is a victory or a loss. It is quite a spectacle. One of the most revered squads in Argentina is Boca Juniors and Mauricio Macri was its President for twelve years. He was elected in 1995 and reelected in 1999 and 2003, to complete one of the most successful periods of Boca, winning several international competitions.[2] He is viewed by many Argentinians as the man who saved the club and many say that “if he did that that with Boca, he can do the same with the country.” They are tired of the same old politicians and desperately want a change. They know Macri is a no nonsense guy who will do well for his country because of his experience as a successful businessman and his pro-market formulations and ideas.

Mauricio Macri belongs to one of the wealthiest business families in the county and is popular with both the working and business classes who view him as an example to follow; he also has the support of millions of Boca Junior fans and other fútbol followers who admire how he managed the club; the upper class as well as big business view him as an equal and one that understands a market economy. Small firms feel in tune with him because he understands their language and he doesn’t run on ideology: left or right mean nothing to him; he is focused on progress and open markets and is passionate about this approach.

Brief History of Boca Juniors
Boca Juniors was born on Monday April 3rd, 1905, when five young boys who lived in the La Boca neighborhood got together with the intention to start a football club. Without even imagining it, this group of Italian immigrants wrote the first pages of the rich history of Argentina’s most popular football team. The name of the club was taken from that of the neighborhood but the word “Juniors” was added to give it an English tone and enhance it with more prestige, in order to counteract the “difficult neighborhood” fame La Boca had at that time. Boca Juniors players wear the classic blue and golden yellow jersey. Throughout almost one hundred years of history many players such as Gabriel Batistuta, Martín Palermo, and Juan Román Riquelme have been Boca Juniors players. However, the most renowned figure of all times in Argentina as well as in world football, who played for the team and is still a fervent fan, is Diego Armando Maradona. The enormous popularity and the successes in sport events harvested in the last years at the international level have positioned Boca as a solid brand mark at the world level. Boca is one of the brands with the greatest symbolic content in the world of football. The institutional evolution attained in the last years, in the sportive aspect through its excellent technical staff, as well as economically, achieved thanks to the management headed by Mr. Mauricio Macri, has allowed the Club Atlético Boca Juniors to be placed at the head of the world ranking of clubs.[1] Macri significantly increased the club’s net worth and annual revenues.

Macri’s Political career
In 2005, after his success at Boca, Macri made his political debut when he ran for Head of Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires with his neo-liberal party “Compromiso para el Cambio” (Commitment to Change). He won the first round of the election with 33.9% but lost the runoff election with 47% of the popular vote to his opponent Aníbal Ibarra.[1] In the 2005 legislative elections he won a seat in the Chamber of Deputies, representing the city of Buenos Aires, with more than 33% of the votes.[2] He joined fellow politician and economist Ricardo López Murphy of Recrear to create an electoral front called Propuesta Republicana (known as PRO) and sat in the PRO block of the Argentina Chamber of Deputies.[3] He was also in discussions with conservative Jorge Sobisch, governor of Neuquén Province, ahead of the 2007 elections. The group he founded in 2005 to oppose President Kirchner intentionally avoided using the word party in its name. Instead, it called itself “Republican Proposal” as a way of representing an alternative to what Macri has described as an authoritarian government.

In 2006, Mauricio Macri was appointed as a Goodwill Ambassador of the Intergovernmental Institution for the use of Micro-algae Spirulina against Malnutrition, IIMSAM, which works to promote the use of micro-algae Spirulina (Spirulina platensis) to counter malnutrition and its severe negative impacts especially in the Developing and the Least Developed Countries (LDC).[4]

In February 2007 Macri announced that he would run once again to be Head of Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires in the 2007 elections, heading the PRO team with Gabriela Michetti as his running mate. In the first round of the election on June 2nd, 2007 he won with 45.6% of the votes over the government-backed candidate, Daniel Filmus, who received 23.8% of the votes. The incumbent Jorge Telerman came in third place. The runoff election between Macri and Filmus took place on June 24th, 2007 and resulted in Macri’s victory with 60.96% of the votes.[5] Given the city’s budget of some $3bn and population of nearly three million, the post of Buenos Aires mayor is seen as the third most important political office in Argentina, after the country’s president and the governor of the province of Buenos Aires (currently Daniel Scioli). Macri’s victory was largely analyzed as a defeat for President Néstor Kirchner and turned him into de facto leader of the right-wing opposition, which has remained fractured after the Argentine political crisis of late 2001.

His victory was seen by many as the emergence of business as an active protagonist in hemispheric politics at a time when populist programs here and elsewhere in Latin America seem to be running out of steam. Macri has made no secret of his intention to re-install neo-conservative politics and economics at center stage. Mr. Macri is a rare breed of politician in Argentina, someone who has not risen through the ranks of a traditional political party but instead comes from the business world. He is considered a center-right politician, and is a staunch critic of left-wing President, Cristina Kirchner.[6]

He is seriously considering the possibility of participating in the next presidential race. That interest was clearly expressed when he said: “We are going to take our time to study what we can do to consolidate national politics.” As opposition leader, he has said that a victory of conservative forces in the presidential elections is on the books if diverse opposition candidates force a run-off in which they could then work together.

Macri is constructing his political career brick by brick with solid marketing techniques and a non-ideological approach to public affairs, appealing to large numbers of “porteños” (people from the city of Buenos Aires) who are tired of politicians prone to more promises than solutions. His slogan is “less talk and more action.” Boosted by his charismatic appeal, during his campaign for Head of Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, he went from neighborhood to neighborhood explaining his proposed policies, accompanied everywhere by his also charismatic vice-mayor candidate, Gabriela Michetti, confined to a wheel chair due to an accident. His supporters covered the city with posters reading, “Buenos Aires is going to be great,” “More free education” and “More free medical care,” plus others related to garbage collection and public safety. His clear inclination for neo-conservative economics suggests that as head of state, he will follow a plan of efficient government and pro-business policies. He has made it clear that he will encourage foreign investors to return to Argentina.[1] He certainly has the international connections to succeed at this.

Despite his economic status in a country where some 26.9% of the population lives below the poverty line, Macri has tried to portray himself as an average man concerned with everyday problems. His years as president of Boca Juniors have helped him strengthen this image. Some consider Macri a political outsider who is bringing a breeze of fresh air to Argentine politics. He has stated “We want to offer an alternative to Argentines... We really want to show there is a new way of doing politics.”

Future President?
Macri has repeatedly said he wants to be the next President of Argentina. He stated that he is already working towards that purpose and is confident enough to say that he will achieve his objective. “I am working to be President. When we achieve power, we’ll have the chance to demonstrate that when things are done correctly, things work”. Mr. Macri said this after another possible candidate, Roberto Lavagna, announced he was going to run for President in 2011.

About PRO’s future, he hopes that it serves as a bridge so that civil society can participate in politics in order for it to stop being an inactive compartment where no one wants to participate because they perceive it as a forbidden environment. We want to end that because we all have to participate since it’s our future. We want to implement a long term model of harmony and national cohabitation and better relations of Argentina with the rest of the world. Our only ally cannot, and I emphasize, cannot be Chávez…we are on the wrong path. I wasn’t born a politician and I started to dedicate myself to it for conviction. I feel that our country deserves a better future. I firmly believe we can make an important contribution by talking less and doing more. I have a business background but I know that with words I won’t change anybody’s mind. I hope that the facts show that the country can take a different and better direction. I also know that you cannot run a country as a business but there is important knowledge that one acquires in the business world that is very useful for improving public management. For example, if someone doesn’t work, that person shouldn’t receive a salary because in the private sector this doesn’t happen.

The bottom line
As Luis Fleischman wrote on July 20th 2007[1], Macri has an agenda that is in many aspects the total opposite of the Kirchner’s style and content. He runs on a platform that promises greater efficiency in the provision of government services (mostly in public education, health and transportation). He repudiates political clientelism, a practice that has characterized most governments, including Kirchner’s. Macri is seen to represent values which the average Argentinian consider important for the functioning of a good government. In a society characterized by a lack of legal security, corruption, chaos, impunity, and economic uncertainty, Macri presents what Argentine journalist Eduardo Aliverti defined as non-ideological programs: law, order, stability, and security.

Many of his critics say that his only experience as an administrator comes from working in his father’s business empire and from running the Boca Juniors football club and therefore he doesn’t have what it takes to become President. But they are wrong. In Argentina, managing the biggest soccer club will give one the experience needed to be able to handle the internal problems of a public office with great responsibilities. Macri decided to run for the Head of the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires in order to attain more experience in public office and the fact that he is being successful as mayor has turned him into one of the most important figures in the nation. Many think he is ready to run the country and they might be exactly right.

*Nicole M. Ferrand. Ms. Ferrand is a research analyst and editor of “The Americas Report” of the Menges Hemispheric Security Project. She is a graduate of Columbia University in Economics and Political Science with a background in Law from Peruvian University, UNIFE and in Corporate Finance from Georgetown University.

[1] The meaning of Kirchner’s recent defeat. By Luis Fleischman. July 20, 2007. http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/Modules/NewsManager/ShowSectionNews.aspx?CategoryID=140&SubCategoryID=142&NewsID=14642
[1] Ibid.

[1] Macri, de La Boca al Congreso. October 12, 2005. Terra.
[2] Ibid.
[3] PRO Official website.
[4] Goodwill Ambassadors / Envoys. IIMSAM. United Nations.
[5] Macri Expects Run-Off Election Win After First Round Victory. June 4, 2007. Bloomberg.
[6] Soccer Team President Wins Mayoral Race. July 3 2007. WorldPress.
[1] Club Atlético Boca Juniors. Official Site.

[1] Mauricio Macri. Curriculum Vitae. Fundación CEMA.
[2] The unofficial biography of Mauricio Macri. Mundo Andino.